D 4.3 - Vulnerable Youth & Gender in Europe

Fatoş Gökşen*, Alpay Filiztekin*, Mark Smith**, Çetin Çelik*, İbrahim Öker* and Sinem Kuz*

*Koc University Social Policy Center

**Grenoble Ecole de Management

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i) to ‘advance the knowledge base that underpins the formulation and implementation of relevant policies in Europe with the aim of enhancing the employment of young people and their transition to economic and social independence’, and

ii) to engage with ‘relevant communities, stakeholders and practitioners in the research with a view to supporting employment policies in Europe.’ Contributions to a dialogue about these results can be made through the project website www.style-research.eu, or by following us on Twitter @STYLEEU.

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About the authors
Fatoş Gökşen – http://www.style-research.eu/team/fatos-goksen
Alpay Filiztekin – http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/alpayf
Mark Smith - http://www.style-research.eu/team/mark-smith
İbrahim Öker – http://www.style-research.eu/team/ibrahim-oker
Sinem Kuz – http://www.style-research.eu/team/sinem-kuz

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Executive Summary

Gender differences in youth labour markets and school to work transitions are frequently underestimated and there is often an assumption that gender gaps only open up around parenthood so that younger generations are largely unaffected. However, the evidence presented here from this comparative research suggests that gender differences open up early in the lifecourse and that the policy environment across European countries is not well adapted to these gender differences on the youth labour market.

In this report we focus on two specific elements: Firstly we map vulnerability by gender across ethnic and class differences and secondly we focus on the extent to which policies for young people recognise gender differences and adopt a gender mainstreaming approach. We use a sample of countries in order to represent four types of regimes for school-to-work transitions – universalistic (Denmark and the Netherlands), liberal (the United Kingdom), employment-centred (France and Belgium) and sub-protective countries (Spain, Greece and Turkey); where the data permits we also include an analysis of Slovakia as an example of a post-communist, but we are unable to provide a policy analysis for this country. Furthermore we benefit from specific, detailed inputs from national researchers in the case of five case study countries covering four of the regimes – Denmark, Spain, France, Greece and the UK.

Our analysis of the EU-SILC data demonstrates that gender gaps for young people exist across almost all measures of educational and labour market statuses used to assess vulnerable outcomes. We also find strong evidence of the intersectionality of youth, gender and other forms of vulnerability linked to migrant status. The extent of these vulnerabilities varies across different school to work regimes but is nevertheless present.

Our analysis of the policy environment towards young people shows that policy towards youth labour markets is often gender blind and there is limited evidence of consistent gender mainstreaming. Given the gender gaps identified in our mapping exercise these policies could be more efficient if they recognised gender differences – for example school drop-out rates for boys, segregation of training opportunities for girls and the interaction of gender and ethnicity in educational choices. Although we find some evidence of good practice that recognises gender differences at the margins and indeed the intersectionality of youth, for gender and other forms of vulnerability more could be done.

We draw a number of conclusions from our work. Firstly we suggest that researchers need to approach the youth labour market from a more consistently gender-sensitive approach in order to understand the nuances and dynamics of emerging gender gaps. These gender gaps help explain the segmentation of the youth labour market and will have life-long repercussions on the risks of vulnerabilities for labour market participants. In addition, in relation to vulnerabilities, researchers need measures and data that are sensitive to the impact of young people living in the parental home and the risk that vulnerabilities are disguised by the household level data. Secondly, we suggest that policy makers need to adopt a more consistent gender mainstreaming approach for three reasons: firstly in order to develop more efficient policies that reflect the realities of youth labour market, secondly in order to address emerging risks for vulnerabilities along gender lines and thirdly in order to capture the intersectionality of gender with other demographic characteristics. Thus both policy makers and researchers can reflect more accurately on the dynamics of youth labour markets across Europe.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALMP</td>
<td>Active Labour Market Policy/Policies</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>BE</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>BME</td>
<td>Black and Minority Ethnic</td>
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<td>CH</td>
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<td>DK</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EE</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>EPL</td>
<td>Employment Protection Legislation</td>
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<td>ES</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU-LFS</td>
<td>European Union- Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>EU-SILC</td>
<td>European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>FR</td>
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<td>IE</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>ISCED</td>
<td>International Standard Classification of Education</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>MT</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEET</td>
<td>Not in Employment, Education or Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NL</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
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<td>SK</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>Standard Occupational Classification</td>
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<td>STW</td>
<td>School to Work</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>VET</td>
<td>Vocational Education and Training</td>
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1. Introduction

Gender differences in youth labour markets and school to work transitions are frequently underestimated (Plantenga et al 2013). There is often an assumption that gender gaps only open up around parenthood and that younger generations are largely unaffected by gendered processes that created divisions for earlier generations. However, the evidence suggests that gender differences open up very early and generally increase (Mills and Präg 2014). These gaps reflect segregation of educational and training choices, as well as process on the labour market that serve to reinforce gender roles and stereotypes. Policies can go some way towards addressing these divisions but need to recognise the importance of gender gaps and the role of approaches such as gender mainstreaming that can help the efficiency and impact of measures to close gender gaps (Plantenga et al. 2007; CEC 2008).

In this report we focus on two specific elements: Firstly the mapping of vulnerability by gender across ethnic and class differences and secondly we focus on the extent to which policies for young people recognise gender differences and contain gender mainstreaming. In conducting these analyses we aim to identify the scope for policy learning. Our report sets out to explore asymmetrical risks that leave some young women and men more vulnerable than others in coping with these within different welfare regimes. We aim to relate these asymmetries to the variations in socioeconomic circumstances. The extent of vulnerabilities and gender differences are shaped by the institutional environment in which young people find themes (Whelan and Maitre 2010). Welfare systems vary depending on socio-economic structures, institutional arrangements and cultural patterns (Walther 2006).

Based upon the work of authors such as Esping-Andersen’s (1990), Gallie and Paugman (2000) and Walther (2006: 124-129) we base our mapping analysis of the EU-SILC data upon four regimes types in the context of school-to-work transitions: universalistic (Denmark, DK; and the Netherlands1, NL), liberal (the United Kingdom, UK), employment-centred (France, FR; and Belgium, BE) and sub-protective countries (Spain, ES; and Greece, GR; Turkey, TR)2. Our detailed policy analysis considers a subset of these country examples: universalistic (Denmark, DK), liberal (the United Kingdom, UK), employment-centred (France, FR) and sub-protective countries (Spain, ES; and Greece, GR). Furthermore in some EU-SILC analyses we make an addition borrowed from Wallace (2002): we also include the Slovak Republic as a representative of a post-socialist regime although no policy analysis is available here.

Universalistic regimes place the individual rights and responsibilities within collective social responsibility and are characterized by comprehensive educational system with minimal streaming and flexible training possibilities (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Counselling is highly institutionalized in all stages of education, training and employment and it facilitates school to work transitions. In

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1 As Walther (2006: 129) puts it “the Netherlands has to be considered the most hybrid transition system, including traits of the liberal as well as the universalistic regimes, such as a flexibilised education and training

2 For a discussion on the categorization of Turkish welfare regime as a sub-protective one see Çelik (2008).
employment-centred regime, the state shapes school to work transition as the key stakeholder and schools are organized more selectively to allocate the youth occupational careers and social positions in different segments. Vocational training plays a central role and is relatively standardized (Walther, 2002). Sub-protective transition regime is typically characterized by low percentage of standard work places and high share of unprotected living conditions (Walther 2006). Therefore, the family and informal economy play major roles in this regime type (Buchmann and Kriesi 2011). Typically vocational training is not well developed and the involvement of the companies in vocational training is weak (Leccardi and Ruspini 2006). Post-socialist regimes are characterized by relatively early transitions to the labour market with extensive informal sectors and irregular employment. There tends to be a weak association between the educational system and labour market, which has a moderate degree of employment protection, is relatively weak.

The early welfare regimes literature was criticised for a lack of gender perspective and this spawned a body of literature criticising work on welfare states for its gender blind approach and in particularly ignoring the contribution of unpaid work (for example Lewis 1992; 1997; Orloff 2002). The work on school work transitions has similarly suffered from a gender blind approach, as much of the research and policy on youth, and tends to ignore the gender differences in the school to work transition. Here we aim to address these gaps by highlighting gender differences in both policy and outcomes.

### 1.1 Aims and organisation of this report

We set out to understand the way in which national institutional arrangements, namely educational systems and related modes of labour markets and welfare regulation affect the youth labour market integration by gender. We are particularly interested in mapping the situation of youth unemployment for vulnerable groups differentiating by gender for variations by ethnicity and socio-economic status.

We firstly provide a quantitative comparison of how these different groups are affected in a selection of European countries, including Turkey. This will identify the type, size and structure of country specific vulnerable groups defined in terms of their lack of access to dominant school to work (STW) pathways and the likelihood of school drop-out. Secondly, we offer an outline of the policies specifically addressing the problems these groups face and the scope of mainstreaming.

The report is organised as follows. After this introduction, in section 2 we discuss the concept of vulnerability and some of the methodological issues impacting upon the analyses conducted in preparing this report. In section 3 we chart the patterns and trends of labour market activity of vulnerable young women and men across a number of EU countries focusing on school drop-out rates and the school to work pathways of youth by ethnicity. Section 4 focuses quality outcomes for vulnerable women and men in terms of material deprivation at the household level and occupational and wage outcomes. Section 5 examines policies towards vulnerable young people in a subset of case study countries with a particular focus on the extent to which gender is considered in youth policy. Section 6 focuses further on the gender dimension of youth policy at the EU level and the extent to which there is evidence of gender mainstreaming at the national level. Finally, section 7 concludes with consideration of the implications of our analysis for future research and the interplay of European and national policy for gender differences among vulnerable youth. Annexes are included with details of the data sources and analyses undertaken.
2. Conceptualising and Mapping Vulnerability

In this section we discuss some of the conceptual and methodological issues around mapping the patterns of vulnerability and gender across different welfare regimes using cross sectional data from European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) appended with Turkish Surveys of Income and Living Conditions and the collection of policy-related data.

2.1 Vulnerability and Vulnerable Groups

The terms “vulnerability” and “vulnerable groups” are commonly used, but often with different meanings by different disciplines. One definition is “the exposure to uninsured risk leading to a socially unacceptable level of well-being” (Hoogeven, Tesliuc and Vakis, 2006: 5). In this definition vulnerability is by no means identical to poverty so that in the absence of vulnerability poverty could persist but in the absence of poverty, on the other hand, vulnerability as risk exposure ceases to be an issue. Another different definition of vulnerability, is that of “weakness or defencelessness” and typically used to describe groups that are weak and liable to serious hardship (Dercon 2006). These are groups that without substantial support may be in severe poverty, unable to take advantage of opportunities if they emerge. These groups often include ethnic minorities, disabled people, those people leaving care, women, the elderly, or migrants. These groups are described as “vulnerable” in the common usage of the term: their options to manage risk are likely to be limited (Hoogeven, Tesliuc and Vakis, 2006).

Morrone, Scrivens, Smith, and Balestra (2011) argue that in its broadest sense the notion of vulnerability refers to the situation of individuals, households or communities who are exposed to potential harm from one or more risks. It also refers to the inability of these people to anticipate, withstand, and recover from the damage resulting from an adverse shock. Again here vulnerability is strongly linked to the concepts of poverty and social exclusion. However, while the poor and excluded are generally the most vulnerable, not all vulnerable people are currently poor or excluded: vulnerability is about insecurity and exposure to risk rather than simply current status. According to Morrone et al. (2011) a person or a household is vulnerable to future loss of well-being below some socially accepted norms if she or he lacks, or is strongly disadvantaged, in the distribution of assets crucial for resilience to risks. The assets they refer to are economic capital, human capital, and social capital. Economic capital describes the sum of financial assets and physical property that make up household wealth. Money in savings accounts, life insurance, pensions -- these all represent different types of wealth offering differing levels of accessibility in times of need. Human capital is most commonly understood in terms of individuals’ education and skills for the labour market. It can also be understood in terms of the sum of competencies and knowledge. Measuring human capital through educational attainment remains the most common approach. A third area of assets is social capital which can be defined as the value of people’s social networks and personal relations. These social connections are essential for wellbeing: without social networks people can miss out on important
information and are unable to fully participate in society (Moorone, Scrivens, Smith, and Balestra, 2011). Similarly, Sobhan (2014) lists the sources vulnerability as educational disparities, health disadvantages, inequitable ownership of productive assets, asymmetrical exposure to market forces, and unjust governance.

Alwang, Siegel and Jorgensen (2001) provide a stimulating, critical review of the different concepts prevalent in disciplines such as economics, anthropology, sociology, and public health. In general, they find some consensus that vulnerability is best defined relative to some benchmark of well-being (Alwang et al. 2001). According to Dercon (2001) vulnerability will always be qualified as ‘vulnerability to poverty’. Taking into account the different dimensions of poverty, this implies that measurement should focus on measuring individuals’ vulnerability to absolute income poverty but also on vulnerability for not being able to complete primary education (i.e. early school drop outs), vulnerability to mortality before the ages of one, five or due to pregnancy-related complications or vulnerability to malnutrition.

On the other hand, sociologists tend to argue that because poverty and lack of assets is a state resulting from combination of factors such as income and/or consumption, measurement of one component will fail to adequately capture the concept of vulnerability. Factors such as capabilities, prospects for earning a living, deprivation and exclusion all help determine vulnerability (Narayan, et al. 2000). Many sociologists have adopted the term vulnerability as an alternative means of characterizing the dimensions of poverty not ordinarily captured by money-metric measures. In fact, sociologists may discuss “social vulnerability” as opposed to “economic vulnerability” (for example Loughead and Mittai, 2000) and identify vulnerable groups such as children at-risk, females, disabled, migrants, or the elderly. As such a sociological approach emphasises vulnerable groups based on broad structural characteristics, not specific measures of economic outcomes and recognises that vulnerability also includes aspects such as “livelihood security” which move beyond typical economic discussions of poverty. Here the concept of “resilience” is relevant as the ability to exploit opportunities, and resist and recover from shocks (Alwang et al. 2001). Disciplines of sociology and anthropology extend the definition of assets beyond financial realms to include social capital and the strength of household relations (Moser, 1998). Others use the vulnerability concept to describe conditions resulting from labour market segmentation that enables researchers to assess more intangible elements of disadvantage (Mcllwaine, 1997).

Based on this diversity of factors affecting vulnerability the current study will focus on multiple sources of vulnerability. Vulnerability, defined for the purpose of this study focuses not on current income inadequacy, but rather insecurity and exposure to the risk of future low incomes and probability that low incomes has a long duration resulting in material deprivation (De Haan, 1998). Therefore, we argue that measures of vulnerability should serve as point-in-time indicators of the risk of exposure to persistent disadvantages and go beyond measures based on a single indicator (World Bank 2000).

By integrating the gender and migrant status of young people with various outcome measures of vulnerability we are able to highlight the interaction of demographic characteristics with labour market and material deprivation outcomes. Following this approach we focus on gender, migration, and social class as likely sources of vulnerability. Unfortunately our data do not permit the integration of other sources of vulnerability such as growing up in care (see Hart et al. 2015). Apart from the obvious sources of vulnerability such as material deprivation and income we also focus on the
particular outcomes creating disadvantage in school-to work transitions across different welfare regimes.

### 2.2 Gender and the Demographics of Vulnerability

Despite significant progress in recent decades, labour markets across the EU remain clearly divided along gender lines (Bettio et al. 2012). Female labour force participation has remained lower than male participation, women still account for most unpaid work, and when women are employed in paid work they are overrepresented in the informal sector and among the poor and low paid. They also face considerable wage differentials compared to their male colleagues and female representation in senior positions, and entrepreneurship remains low (O’Reilly et al. 2015). The average gender participation gap has been declining since 1990s but remains significant -- largely due to a fall in male labour force participation rates combined with rising or stable female participation rates. Nevertheless, employment opportunities remain segregated. Across the EU female employment is concentrated in the service sector which accounts for 86.4% of employed women compared 64.1% of men (Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2013). This segregation of opportunities can create variations in job quality and risk or vulnerabilities since women overrepresented in sectors that are characterized by poorer working condition, low status and pay (ILO 2010; Smith et al. 2013).

During the economic crisis of 2007-2009, gender based employment gaps shrunk in most EU countries. But this trend is largely explained by more robust employment in the services sector, where female employment is concentrated and a levelling down of men’s employment as male-dominated industries such as construction and manufacturing suffered (OECD, 2012). However the austerity period has demonstrated that women are vulnerable to these changing economic conditions (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). Furthermore there are a number of factors that help explain why women should continue to be considered as a vulnerable group. Firstly, women face a double burden of paid work and reproductive work in the household and this unpaid work in the household underpins much labour market inequality. Studies from around the world indicate that family care responsibilities, including the lack of childcare options, are among the factors that severely constrain women’s choices in employment (for example Lewis et al. 2008). Poverty is increasingly feminised (Kabeer 2015). Poverty rates are measured by income, usually taken from household surveys, and this household perspective means that such statistics are hard to disaggregate by sex and are therefore unhelpful in understanding the gender dimensions of poverty. However, the evidence that does exist suggests that women account for a large proportion of the poor in the world (UNIFEM, 2005). Women make up a large proportion of people working in the informal economy where decent work deficits are most serious. Serious wage and income differentials exist between men and women throughout the EU. This is one of the most persistent forms of discrimination and there is little evidence that the trend is narrowing.

The gender pay gap is an important factor in explaining the position of women among the poor and vulnerable (Smith 2012, O’Reilly, Smith, Deakin and Burchell 2015). Pay inequalities open up early in life and their impacts extend across the whole life course into retirement. According to the European Commission, where data on wage gaps are reliable, the pay gap in the European Union between men and women has remained virtually unchanged at 15 per cent across all sectors in recent years and has narrowed by only one percentage point since 2000 (ILO, 2011).
These gender differences on and off the labour market that create risks of vulnerability do not exist in a vacuum and can interact with other dimensions to change or exacerbate such risks. This intersectionality of gender (Verloo 2006) with other dimensions means that we can consider layers of potential vulnerability, which may interact. Here we focus particularly on the migrant status of young women and men across the EU as one of these intersectionalities.

Migrant youth – particularly those in lower skilled, unskilled and/or irregular situations – face risks of discrimination, exclusion and unemployment in many countries. Young migrants may commonly face non-recognition of training credentials resulting in “de-skilling” where they only obtain jobs beneath their qualifications (Cortino, Taran, and Raphael, 2014). The frequent result is ‘deskilling’ where they are only able to obtain jobs at far below their level of qualifications. Not infrequently, this means relegation to precarious and poorly paid work for migrants. Furthermore, the unregulated and flexible economy has allowed many young migrants to easily find work and businesses to remain competitive while simultaneously producing divisions amongst workers, both between (native) born/migrant and between different groupings of labour migrants.

Liebig and Widmaier (2009) show that low levels of education and socio-economic status of parents may help determine lower educational outcomes among children of immigrants in European OECD countries. These two factors appear to explain the educational disadvantages of children of immigrants with European backgrounds. The labour market situation of second-generation youth and those who emigrated at a young age is largely influenced by their educational achievement, but other factors are at play as well. Across OECD countries for which data are available, the average unemployment rate for children of immigrants is about 1.6 times higher than for children of non-immigrants. For example the gaps are particularly large in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Employment rates for children born in those countries to immigrant parents are more than 20 per cent lower than those of male and female youth of the same age born to non-immigrant parents. The differences are also significant in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Of greatest concern are young people on the margins of the labour market – that is, those who have few years of schooling and are neither studying nor employed or in training. With few exceptions, children of immigrants are more likely to fall into this group, and women are more vulnerable than men, especially young women immigrants.

These challenges facing migrant youth interact with gender. Rubin et al. (2008) show that migrant women fare worse than both native-born women and migrant men. There are, however, differences in the labour market outcomes of migrant women with different characteristics. Disaggregating migrant women into those born within the EU and those from third-countries, it becomes apparent that third-country women migrants face even greater levels of disadvantage in the EU labour force than all other groups: more than EU born migrant women, migrant men and native-born women (Peracchi, and Depalo, 2006). Previous research has identified a range of factors that influence the success of immigrant women in European labour markets, for example educational attainment and skills, and the presence of children (Heron, 2005). However, it is the combination of both sets of factors which presents particular challenges for migrant women’s successful integration into the labour market (Peracchi and Depalo, 2006).

By examining the situation of young women and men on the labour market by ethnic status we hope to highlight some of the risks of becoming vulnerable across the EU.
2.3 EU-SILC Data: opportunities and limitations

Here we use EU-SILC waves through 2005 to 2013 (from 2006 to 2012 in the case of Turkey) to analyse the extent to which the situation has changed in the last decade, especially after the economic crisis of 2008-2010 when we observe varying changes in employment protection measures in Europe.

In our analysis the term “youth” refers to all individuals of ages 16 to 29. When necessary, we also provide comparison of these groups with the “adult population”, defined as individuals between ages 30 and 54. We emphasize differences between males and females as the latter group has been implicitly assigned certain social roles in some countries and the effect of such roles could only be revealed comparing their labour market performance and their lack of access to education.

Ideally, besides gender and migrant status, we would also like to analyse the performance of minorities as vulnerable groups. The interaction of ethnicity and gender provides an important dimension to the study and the challenges facing Europe today. However, the EU-SILC dataset does not allow for any ethnic or religious identification other than the country of birth (or rather whether the country of residence of the mother at the time of birth is a member of the EU or not\(^3\)). Therefore, we are limited to only providing information on “migrants”, those who are not born in the EU. Furthermore, the Turkish data do not contain any information on either minorities or migrants.

Regarding the social class, we tried to adopt parental occupational class positions as a proxy for the young people’s social classes. In the social class literature it is argued that occupational categories, in the light of the available evidence, are typically comparable, on the one hand, in terms of their sources and levels of income, their degree of economic security and chances of economic advancement and, on the other hand in their location within the systems of authority and control governing the processes of production in which they are engaged, and hence in their degree of autonomy in performing their work-tasks and roles (Goldthorpe, 1980). For studies dealing with huge quantitative data across countries it is not possible to use other social class proxies as it is discussed elsewhere in the literature (Wright, 1985, 1988, 1997; Erikson & Goldhorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 2000, 2007).

However, although we were convinced, both theoretically and practically, with the necessity to use occupational position as an indicator of social class we are faced with another identification problem – the data do not allow us to identify the occupational positions of the parents of the youth who are not living with their parents. These variables are present only for those who are living with their parents. Hence, rather than taking social class as a dimension of vulnerability, we used occupational class positions as a dependent variable in our econometric analysis in order to capture how the quality of youth transitions varies for different vulnerable groups.

In addition to complete our analysis we use as another indicator of vulnerability in relation to social class: material deprivation. This indicator refers to a state of economic strain and durables, defined as

\(^3\) The number of those who are born in a different EU country and currently reside in another one is too few to make a systematic analysis and, therefore, they are treated as “natives".
the enforced inability to pay unexpected expenses (rather than the choice not to pay these). These can include affording a one-week annual holiday away from home, a meal involving meat, chicken or fish every second day, the adequate heating of a dwelling, durable goods like a washing machine, colour television, telephone or car, or being confronted with payment arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills, hire purchase instalments or other loan payments).

The material deprivation rate is an indicator in the EU-SILC that expresses the inability to afford some items considered by most people to be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life. The indicator distinguishes between individuals who cannot afford a certain good or service, and those who do not have this good or service for another reason, for example because they do not want or do not need it.

Finally, we use data on living with parents to see whether living with the family may constitute a buffer against adverse economic shocks (or indeed as a proxy for social capital) for vulnerable groups. However, we refrained from including both material deprivation and living with parents as explanatory variables in our estimation analysis since we suggest that the direction of causality is quite problematic. A young person may choose not to enter in the labour market or may prefer to stay unemployed if she/he receives parental support (cf. Gökşen et. al., 2015). It is also very likely that an individual who faces difficulties in the labour market may choose to go back to their parental home (Kaplan, 2012; Ermisch, 1999). Similarly, material deprivation, too, can be endogenous.

### Table 1: Shares of Females and Migrants by Age Group (16-29 and 30-54)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of population</th>
<th>Share of Native Males</th>
<th>Share of Native Females</th>
<th>Share of Migrant Males</th>
<th>Share of Migrant Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ages 16-29</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ages 30-54</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
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<td>46.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
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<td>44.9</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>67.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>66.7</td>
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<td>44.7</td>
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<td>ES</td>
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<td>44.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
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<td>45.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.*
A description of our sample is given in Table 1 where relative shares of vulnerable groups in the total population by age group are provided. All tables and figures in the analysis use personal cross-sectional weights of all household members over 16. Notably, in Turkey and Slovakia the young population is significantly different from the selected set of countries in terms of the proportion of youth in their society – around two fifths. In European countries, youth constitute around one third of the population over 16, except for Slovakia where the share is approaching 40%.

Since there is no data on ethnicity, we focus on migrant status. Migrants constitute 5-11% of the population in the selected countries, except for Slovakia where there are very few. The share of migrants is higher in the UK and Spain approaching 11% and they constitute only 5.4% in Denmark. In all these countries the share of migrants is higher in the adult population. This is most likely due to the children of early migrants having been born in the EU, and we cannot identify their ethnic origins with the current dataset. Moreover, share of female migrants among the youth is considerably higher than males in all country groups.

2.4 Methods for collecting information on policy

We complement our analysis of the EU-SILC data with an examination of the policy environment in a subset of five case study countries – Denmark, Spain, Greece, France, and the UK. Here we select countries that are representative of contributors to the STYLE project and also from a variety of school to work transition regimes: universalistic (Denmark, DK), liberal (the United Kingdom, UK), employment-centred (France, FR) and sub-protective countries (Spain, ES; and Greece, GR).

We draw upon the contributions that national research teams made towards other work packages of the STYLE project (namely WP3 and WP4) as well as specific national contributions that the teams made focused on gender dimension to policy making (see section 5 and 6 for details). For the latter the research teams were required to provide overview of vulnerable workers, an examination of the situation of vulnerable workers on the labour market with a particular focus on situation of vulnerable young women and men. This was followed by a brief examination of the labour market policy approaches from a youth and gender perspective again focusing on vulnerability with example(s) of good practice and poor practice. We would like to thank them for their contributions.

4 More detailed information on weights and its construction can be found in EU-SILC manual.
3. Mapping of Vulnerable Groups

In this section we map a number of educational and labour market outcomes by gender across our sample of countries. We examine the patterns of school drop-out rates and the school to work pathways of youth, with a particular emphasis on vulnerable groups, namely, females and migrants, across different regimes using cross sectional data from European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) appended with Turkish Surveys of Income and Living Conditions. Here we focus on gender differences for nine countries representing different regimes: universalistic (Denmark, DK; and the Netherlands, NL), liberal (the United Kingdom, UK), employment-centred (France, FR; and Belgium, BE) and sub-protective countries (Spain, ES; and Greece, GR; Turkey, TR) and post-socialist country (Slovakia SK)

In the next subsection we first discuss educational attainment of youth. Since a third to half of the 16-29 year old population are still at school at the time of interviews (16-29? Age group?), it is important to understand the age they leave school, as early dropout rates from education is one factor that increases the risk of vulnerability. We then move to describe the labour market outcomes of those who left school early. We examine unemployment, joblessness and NEET status. We also estimate the probability of different employment statuses using a multinomial logit model and assess the importance of gender and migrant status for likelihood of various vulnerable labour market statuses.

3.1 Educational Attainment across Vulnerabilities

We provide three summary statistics; the share of youth in education, average school finishing ages and the highest level of education attained of those who declare themselves not to be a student, in other words, dropouts.

Table 3.1 shows the share of youth who report to be in education (see Eurostat 2015 for details). The decision to stay in school might be affected by turns of the business cycle. Therefore, the following tables report statistics for three sub-periods, pre-crisis years covering 2005-2008, crisis years 2009-2010, and post-crisis years 2011-2013.

The share of students among youth is highest in Denmark, followed by the Slovak Republic at all sub-periods. Among the EU countries, the UK has the smallest share of students among youth. However, along with Denmark and the Netherlands, proportionally more adults are in education in the UK (see figure 3.1 for average school leaving age). Perhaps not surprisingly, the share of students is lowest in Turkey where dropout rates are very high and substantially large informal sector absorbs young people with very limited qualifications.

During and after the crisis the share of students has increased in all countries, possibly as a response to tightening of job market prospects. There is also some stickiness in the shares after the crisis: students who decided to stay in school during crisis had already incurred a sunk cost and they are likely to stay in education after the crisis. A comparison of pre- and post-crisis yields that the share of
students increased more than seven percentage points in Spain and Denmark, and more mildly, around one and a half percentage points, in France and the UK.

Table 3.1: Shares of Students in Selected Countries across Periods of Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ages 16-29</th>
<th>Ages 30-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native Males</td>
<td>Native Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Crisis, 2011-2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis, 2009-2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Crisis, 2005-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>36.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

There was a variation among countries in the relative shares of males and females in education before crisis. After the crisis, the share of students amongst women is higher than males in all EU countries (the shares are equal in the UK), suggesting that females faced increased difficulty to find a job (cf. OECD, 2012), if staying at school is a decision to postpone entry to the job market. In Turkey, the large gap in favour of males before the crisis has eroded over time.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) In Turkey there was a change in compulsory schooling law in 1997 that affected individuals born in 1986 which led to the closing of this gender gap has female participation caught up with men’s.
Young migrant males typically have higher participation as students than young native males, except in the southern countries. In contrast, smaller shares of young migrant females are students compared to their native counterparts in all countries, with the exception of the Netherlands and the UK. Since we know little about migrants from the EU-SILC data (other than they are born in non-EU countries), two factors could be in play here. One, some of these migrants are in these countries to obtain education, particularly in the Netherlands and the UK where the difference in participation in education between migrants and native males females is highest. Second, it is likely that some migrant youth face difficulties in finding a job and so remain in education.

3.1.1 Dropout rates across vulnerabilities

The EU-SILC data provide information on the year in which individuals finished highest level of education and from this it is possible to estimate average dropout age in each country. In figure 3.1 we provide the cumulative distribution by age of those youth who are not in education. Median age of school leaving is 19 in Denmark, the Netherlands, France and the UK; 18 in Belgium and Slovakia; and 17 in Greece and Spain. Turkey with median school leaving age of 15 differs again from the EU countries. As discussed in Gökşen and Cemalcilar (2010) dropout age might be lower in Turkey because of high rural to urban migration rates, and cultural constraints especially in the case of young women.

Figure 3.1 shows that the distribution for males dominates the distribution of females in all countries, except Turkey, confirming previous figures that females spend more time in education in Europe. Alternatively we can say that dropping out is more common among the young males except in Turkey which might partially be explained by strong patriarchal gender roles particularly in non-metropolitan areas (Rankin and Aytac 2006).

In Spain and Greece where the rate of early school leaving is generally high and vocational training is weakly developed, migrants leave school earlier than natives (see box 3.1). The considerable size of the informal market that absorbs these low-skilled individuals may partly explain this finding. In other countries the distributions of migrants and natives cross around the ages 16 to 18, implying that there is a bi-modality in migrants’ school drop-out behaviour (for example the Netherlands in figure 3.1). Some migrant youth drop out earlier than natives, but those that do not leave school around ages 16 to 18 tend to leave much later. This latter group who stay on might suggest they migrated to their respective countries for the purposes of education or they may be encouraged to invest heavily in education.

In Figure 3.2, we provide educational attainment of the youth who are not in education at three educational levels; that is we look at the rate of dropouts at the levels of less than upper secondary, upper secondary and tertiary education. As shown in Figure 3.2, the share of youth, and particularly, adults who are in education is significantly higher in Denmark than any other country. Similarly, more than 10% of young Danes leave school after the age of 24 (Figure 3.1), older than those in other countries. Denmark differs here from the remaining countries in that individuals stay in education

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6 The share of migrants in the Slovak Republic is too few for any meaningful interpretation. Figures are only suggestive and we refrain to add any other comments.
longer. This may be due to the existence of dual status in Denmark where youth above the age 18 who are in education or training are entitled to an educational allowance (Walther, 2002).

Box 3.1 Gender and Early School Leaving - evidence from the case study countries

Evidence from the national reports of the five case study counties confirms the importance of gender differences in early school leaving. Both Denmark and the UK suffer from high dropout/early school leaver rates. For example, according to the Danish Ministry of Education, in 2015 51% of VET-students did not finish their programme, and completion rates are consistently lower for men. As noted in WP 4.1, the recent VET-reform aims to reduce dropout rates, but it is too early to tell if it will be successful.

In the UK, in 2014, national data show an early school leaving rate of 11.8% that was close to the EU average (11.1%). Significantly, in the UK, the rate of those aged 18-24 who left school early fell from 15% in 2011 to 11.8% in 2014, not least due to the school leaving age being raised. In contrast to other EU countries, students born outside the UK (9.4%) are more likely to leave school early than those born in the UK (12.2%), with rates among males and females closer to the average across the EU (12.8% and 10.7% respectively).

Similar to the UK, Greece saw the early school leaving average rate improve throughout the 2000s, resting at 10.1% in 2013 (EU-28 average 11.9%; EU2020 target less than 10%). Like Denmark, rates amongst males tend to be higher (12.7%), particularly in secondary vocational-technical schools and lyceums.

Sources: Petmesidou and Polyzoidis (Greece); Tejero and González-Menéndez (Spain); Hadjivassiliou, Rickard and Swift (UK)

The highest share of youth with less than upper secondary education is found in Spain, particularly among males, 50% of which did not obtain upper secondary degree. This is mainly because of the strong demand for low-educated workers in the construction sector, which used to offer better employment opportunities and the relatively high wages before the crisis. Many young males dropped out of education at an early age in search of hefty wages at this sector. Unfortunately, the crises evaporated these jobs and most of these youth remain jobless without clear employment prospects for the future (Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jansen 2013).

In all European countries, females have higher educational attainment than males. The share of females with tertiary education is not lower than 25% in any of the European countries and higher share of females have at least an upper secondary education. In terms of gender differences Turkey is an outlier. Females have lower educational attainment, in fact, 45% of them do not even have a primary school degree7 (Figure 3.1) which again could be a consequence of the social, cultural and labour market factors that are discussed earlier in this section.8

---

7 The number can be biased upwards as compulsory years of schooling was five years for those who were born before 1986 and increased to 8 in 1997 for those who are born later. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that the compliance with the law was very low, especially in the Eastern part of the country. Strangely, after the change in compulsory schooling law, attendance was not mandatory and official statistics show no drop-outs. Since we are using self-declared educational attainment, we suspect that the numbers are much closer to true values than official statistics.

8 For example in the UK, higher shares of both young migrant male and female migrants have tertiary degrees, relative to natives, which may be related to differences in labour market conditions in the UK and Continental Europe, as well as some cultural pressures to invest heavily in education (see section 5).
Figure 3.1: Distributions of School Leaving Age (Ages 16-29)

Denmark

The Netherlands

France

Belgium

Slovak Republic

The United Kingdom

Spain

Greece

Turkey

For those who have not completed any school the age leaving school is coded as zero.

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16
3.2 Labour market outcomes of the youth across vulnerabilities

In Figure 3.3 we provide the distribution of self-declared main activity of youth in each country over time. We define unemployed as those who claim to be looking for a job and ready to start working. The ‘inactive’ are neither employed, unemployed or students. The transition process may involve several intermediate statuses between learning and work, such as temporary jobs, or dual statuses, i.e. combining learning and work, such as apprenticeships or part-time student jobs (Thiessen and Looker, 1999; Walther et al., 2005). Part-time work, for some young people might be associated with a risk of vulnerability, if they are working because they need to support their family income, and unless it includes some type of learning that might be of benefit to their future career.

Figure 3.3 shows significant variations in labour force participation, unemployment, and employment rates, and employment types both across countries and across time. While part-time employment is almost non-existent in the Slovak Republic, a significant portion of Dutch youth is employed as part timers (cf. Furlong and McNeish, 2001; Pohl and Stauber, 2004). The share of youth who are inactive is significantly higher in the UK and sub-protective regime countries than universalistic countries.
Figure 3.3: Employment Status across Periods of Crisis (Ages 16-29)

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those aged 16-29 years
Table 3.3 provides unemployment rates of youth by gender and migrant status in different countries at three different sub-periods and demonstrates the rising rates of unemployment, particularly in countries like Spain and Greece (see also section 5). There is a clear trend of rising youth unemployment all over in Europe with universalistic countries (Denmark and the Netherlands) and the UK having relatively lower rates before the crisis (cf. Hammer 2003; Breen 2005; Bell and Blanchflower). While the increases slowed in most countries after the crisis, more than one third of the youth in labour force is still unemployed in the sub-protective regime countries as of 2013.

### Table 3.3: Unemployment Rates across Vulnerable Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ages 16-29</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ages 30-54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Crisis, 2011-2013</td>
<td>Crisis, 2009-2010</td>
<td>Pre-Crisis, 2005-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

In all European countries, apart from the UK, females had a higher unemployment rate before the crisis but the rises in unemployment rate for young males meant that gender gaps closed and in some cases reversed. Nevertheless, these higher female unemployment rates persist, particularly in sub-protective regimes, in spite of young women’s higher educational qualifications.
Evidence from the national reports of the five case study countries confirms the importance of gender differences in unemployment patterns. For example in Greece, between 2008 and 2013, the unemployment rate quadrupled amongst men aged 15-24 with up to secondary level education, and increased even more among those aged 25-29. This is mostly due to the collapse of demand in the construction, manufacturing and retail trade sectors (where activity fell by 70%, 26% and 34% respectively, during that period). Women exhibited higher unemployment rates than men at all three levels of education and in both age-groups even before the crisis. Particularly for those with a secondary (and post-secondary, non-tertiary) education, the number of unemployed women was double that of men (mostly for those aged 24-29). The crisis has aggravated unemployment among women, but the gender gap has diminished due to the rapid rise of unemployment among young men in both age-brackets, rather than because of an improvement in women’s employment conditions.

Similarly, in Spain in 2014 there were no significant differences between unemployment rates of young women and men (39.1% and 40.2% respectively for 15-29 years), again attributed to an increase of youth unemployment in general, and of young men unemployed in particular, not to an improvement in the number of women employed. Like Greece, Spain witnessed more pronounced gender differences in youth employment in the past: in 2006, the rates were 16.4% and 11.1% for women and men respectively.

A similar gender difference was noted in France: it was reported that during the first seven years after leaving education, twice as many women as men experience a long period of unemployment (17% and 9%, respectively). This is particularly acute amongst the least qualified. For example, the unemployment rate among holders of a lower secondary vocational diploma (CAP, BEP) was 16% for women and 8% for men.

The dynamics are slightly different in both Denmark and the UK. In Denmark, youth unemployment never reached the levels of the harder hit parts of Europe. It increased quite rapidly after the crisis, yet currently remains below the EU-28 average. One of the consequences was an increase in the number of nationally-defined “poor young” persons and young homeless persons (18-24) - a significantly higher number of young men comprise this group. In the UK, the inactivity rate is higher for young women in general and young men are more badly affected by unemployment. Nearly 15% of men under the age of 25 were unemployed in August-October 2015, compared to 12.4% of women. Young men are more likely to find themselves in long-term unemployment (over 12 months) and seem to suffer particularly from the combined effects of underachievement at school, the socio-economic effects of de-industrialisation, and social and health problems.

Ethnicity is also at play when looking at unemployment in the UK. According to the analysis of the 2011 census, young people (aged 16-24) from the Gypsy or Irish Travellers (14%), White and Black Caribbean (13%) and Black Caribbean (12%) ethnic groups had the highest proportion of young unemployed people. In general young black men and women (and those from other ethnic minority groups) are more likely to be unemployed than others. In 2013, the unemployment rate of white young people was 18.6% as opposed to 46.4% for young Pakistanis/Bangladeshis and 44.3% for young black people (DWP, 2014 – see Table 11 in the Annex). Moreover, the gap between the average unemployment rate for young people from ethnic minorities and that for young whites increased from 12% to 13% between 2007 and 2012.

Source: Carstensen and Lyhne Ibsen (Denmark); Bheemaiah and Smith (France); Petmesidou and Polyzoidis (Greece); Tejero and González-Menéndez (Spain); Hadjivassiliou, Rickard and Swift (UK)

As for migrants, they tended to have higher unemployment rates even before the crisis and were affected by the crisis more than natives. Particularly in employment-centred France and Belgium, the young migrant unemployment rate was over 25% during and after the crisis. The French labour market is highly polarized on a highly protective fixed-term contract and more precarious flexible contracts and those, who do not achieve baccalaureate, cumulate in jobs with flexible contracts. The strong link between socioeconomic background and educational achievement in the French educational system results in accumulation of disadvantaged students into the second type of contract in the market (Smith, Toraldo, and Pasquier, 2015). In Denmark and the UK, on the other
hand, migrant youth unemployment rate is lower than the native youth. Lower unemployment rates among migrants in Denmark can partly be explained by the VET system which is based on the combined dual training principle in school and work. With the high involvement of employers in training, VET system turns into a collectivistic skill formation system, which is more inclusive, compared to France (Crowley et al., 2013).

The unemployment rates for Turkish youth do not follow the same path; it increased slightly during the 2009-2010 period and came down back to pre-crisis levels afterwards. While Turkish economy is hit hard in 2009 (the economy shrunk almost 5%), the recovery was quite fast (the economy grew over 8% in the following two years).

**Figure 3.4: Youth Unemployment Rates by Vulnerable Groups**

![Graph showing youth unemployment rates by vulnerable groups](image)

**Source:** Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

Youth unemployment rates vary with the level of educational attainment. In Table 3.4 we provide unemployment rates for three different level of attainment, less than upper secondary, upper secondary and tertiary. In general, unemployment rate is higher for less educated and that is the case in most countries, except Greece and Turkey in the early periods, which could be attributed to production structure, whether it is skill-intensive, or not and whether there is greater substitutability of different skills in production (and which requires a different analysis). One third to one half of the participating youth with less than upper secondary educational attainment were unemployed in employment-centered France and Belgium, in sub-protective Spain and Greece, and post-socialist the Slovak Republic (where share of less educated youth is quite low) in the aftermath of the economic crisis.
Table 3.4: Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment

<table>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

3.2.1 Joblessness and NEETs

The standard measures of unemployment are useful but not sufficient to describe the labour market prospects of youth and especially vulnerable groups. The traditional indicators for labour market participation are frequently criticised for their limited relevance to young people. The fact is that basic unemployment and employment statistics do not accurately capture the situation of young people because many are students and hence are classified as being out of the labour force. EU policymakers have recently started to focus their attention on the NEET group (see box 3.2). This group comprises persons typically aged between 15 and 24 years who, regardless of their educational level, are disengaged from both work and education and are therefore at a higher risk of labour market and social exclusion. In Table 3.5 we provide information about those, who are neither employed nor in education nor in training (NEET) across vulnerable groups.

As expected rate of NEETs increases in all selected countries but Turkey over time. In the aftermath of the crisis ten to fifteen percent of young males are NEETs in the UK, employment-centred countries, and Slovakia, and one quarter to one third of those in Spain and Greece. NEET is a lesser problem in universalistic countries, as a larger share of youth is in education in Denmark (Table 2) and a significant share of youth has part-time employment in the Netherlands (see below).

In general, being a NEET is a more serious phenomenon for females. Note that the unemployment rate for young females in 2011-2013 period was less than the unemployment rate of young males.
Together, findings imply that a larger share of young females stays out of labour force (inactive) rather than being unemployed.

Table 3.5: Share of NEETs across Periods of Crisis by Gender and Migrant Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Post-Crisis, 2011-2013</th>
<th>Crisis, 2009-2010</th>
<th>Pre-Crisis, 2005-2008</th>
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<td>25.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

Box 3.2 Gender and NEET Status - evidence from the case study countries

Evidence from the national reports of the five case study counties the NEET rates for countries covered in this report appear to vary considerably, some being more affected by the most recent crisis than others. For example, in Greece, the NEET rate among youngsters aged 15-24 was one of the highest in the EU-28 at approximately 19% in 2014, increasing sharply amongst men and women aged 25-29 with upper secondary or higher level of education. While NEET does not seem to be a big problem in Denmark for women or men, the NEET rate there increased due to the economic crisis. Spain saw a decrease in NEET rates before and after the crisis: in 2006 the rate was 6.9% of youth and decreased to 5.8% in 2014. In France, NEET rates increased from 6% to 6.9% for young males with an ISCED 2011 level of education between the ages of 15-19, whilst the rate for young women stayed between 5.5% to 6%. The UK saw a modest decrease in NEETs aged 15-24 from 12.1% to 11.7% in the period 2008-2015.

In four of the five countries cases highlighted gender differences in NEET rates with various explanations ranging from institutional efforts that promote gendered work segregation to limited access to education, training and work for women as mothers and/or care givers. Greece, Spain, France and the UK reported higher NEET rates amongst women; Denmark reported no significant difference between genders - both at around 6-8%. In Greece, the NEET rate has persistently been higher among women of both age brackets (15-24 and 25-29) reinforcing youth unemployment and education/labour market mismatches due to a degree structure that has persistently oriented graduates to the public sector (mostly as teachers and public administrators). Spain also reports significant gender differences. In 2006, the female rate was twice the male rate (9.4% versus 4.6%), indicating that young women face more problems in accessing work and training.

Similarly in the UK, there is a clear gender dimension in the NEET population. Since 2001, there have been, on average, 130,000 more young women NEETs per annum than young men. In 2015 ONS data confirm more women (12.8%) were NEET than men (10.9%). Women made up 53.9% of 16-24 year olds classified as NEET. This is partly due to the higher incidence of motherhood among young women in the UK, which takes them out of the labour market for extended periods, as access to affordable childcare is limited. Moreover, young women spend longer as NEET, i.e. three years as opposed to two for men, while also at greater risk of low pay or insecure employment. The NEET rate is particularly high for young women with a low level of education (35%). The persistence of the gender gap (albeit significantly reduced) indicates continued barriers to employment, education or training for young women – these are primarily associated with the greater likelihood of young women being carers.

Source: Carstensen and Lyhne-Ibsen (Denmark); Bheemaiah and Smith (France); Petmesidou and Polyzoidis (Greece); Tejero and González-Menéndez (Spain); Hadjivassiliou, Rickard and Swift (UK)
NEET situation is more common among migrants and increased much faster than natives. Forty to fifty percent of migrants are jobless in Spain and Greece, and in employment-centred France and Belgium the share of jobless among migrants is as high as in southern countries. As also discussed in Section 5, the strong link between socioeconomic background and educational achievement in the French educational system is quite strong. The children of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants fail and leave school more often than their native French counterparts and this results in accumulation of them into the second type of contract in the market, or no work at all (Alba, Sloan, and Sperling 2011).

Once again, Turkey displays a different trend, despite significant improvement over time, more than half of young females are neither employed nor in education. Together with low share of female students in this country, the figures show that labour force participation of women is at very low levels. Familial social policies with very limited provision of public childcare, severely gendered nature of vocational education, and overall low educational attainment are likely to lead to these low figures.

In all countries, as expected, individuals with lower education are more likely to be jobless, although the levels vary significantly. In the UK, for example, the share of NEETs among less than upper secondary education population reaches 30% whereas this number is below 10% in universalistic countries. The highest share of NEET in all education groups is in Turkey where 15% of those who have a tertiary education is jobless (possibly due to the gender factor).

Table 3.6 shows the self-reported NEET status at the time of the survey. It is perhaps not surprising for young individuals to have a short spell of joblessness. The dataset also provides information on how many months an individual has been jobless. Based on this variable we have constructed alternative measures of NEET status, whether the individual have been jobless throughout the year (all-year-NEET), or have been jobless ever in the previous year (ever-NEET). Table 3.6 shows the share of all-year-NEET and ever-NEET fractions together with average number of months an individual has been jobless and Figure 6 provides a visual representation in the latter period.

The share of NEETs has increased for both genders in all countries under investigation. The share of all-year-NEET in the post-crisis period is highest in Greece followed by Spain and the UK. In general, females are more likely to be to be all-year-NEET than males. Similarly, migrants are also more likely to stay jobless longer than natives, particularly in France and Belgium the gap between the shares of natives and migrants who are all-year-NEET is very large. The universalist and academic oriented school system in France seems to create a significant obstacle for the less socially favoured groups.

Along with the increase in all-year-NEET status, average duration in months has also increased in all countries except Denmark (figure 3.5). The Danish policy of obliging young people into enrolment by way of tightening benefits (obligation to education, rather than right to education) might explain the low duration of NEET status. Education benefit has been introduced to signal that young people under 30 years without ordinary education should not receive the ‘normal’ benefit. As such, this indicates a shift in targeting NEETS from traditional labour market policies to education-oriented policies.
Again Turkey differs from the European countries in that there is no negative effect of crisis, but more importantly, the share of women who stay out of employment and education all year long is between 40 to 50%. There is strong indication that Turkish women stays at home more than anyone else.

Table 3.6: Duration of NEET Status by Gender and Migrant Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native Males</th>
<th>Native Females</th>
<th>Migrant Males</th>
<th>Migrant Females</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Ever NEET</td>
<td>All Year</td>
<td>Mont hs of</td>
<td>Ever NEET</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Mont</td>
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</table>

*Post-Crisis, 2011-2012*

| DK             | 11.4         | 4.2            | 7.2           | 8.5             | 2.8            | 6.7           | 11.4            | 4.2            | 9.5           |
| NL             | 10.8         | 4.4            | 6.9           | 9.6             | 3.0            | 8.8           | 10.8            | 4.4            | 8.7           |
| FR             | 30.8         | 10.2           | 8.0           | 28.3            | 6.8            | 8.6           | 32.6            | 10.2           | 9.9           |
| BE             | 21.6         | 10.1           | 7.5           | 17.3            | 5.9            | 8.6           | 21.6            | 10.1           | 10.5          |
| SK             | 20.7         | 11.4           | 8.7           | 16.3            | 7.2            | 0.0           | 20.7            | 11.4           | 12.0          |
| UK             | 19.3         | 11.2           | 9.3           | 14.2            | 7.2            | 8.7           | 19.3            | 11.2           | 10.5          |
| ES             | 29.2         | 13.5           | 8.4           | 26.6            | 11.1           | 8.2           | 29.2            | 13.5           | 9.9           |
| GR             | 28.8         | 18.0           | 9.3           | 25.0            | 11.6           | 7.4           | 28.8            | 18.0           | 10.8          |
| TR             | 56.9         | 43.3           | 10.5          | n.a.            | n.a.           | n.a.          | n.a.            | n.a.           | n.a.          |

*Crisis, 2009-2010*

| DK             | 11.2         | 3.7            | 7.4           | 8.0             | 2.9            | 8.8           | 11.2            | 3.7            | 10.0          |
| NL             | 14.8         | 5.6            | 6.2           | 12.1            | 2.6            | 5.9           | 14.8            | 5.6            | 9.5           |
| FR             | 34.9         | 11.1           | 8.2           | 23.4            | 5.2            | 8.1           | 34.9            | 11.1           | 10.0          |
| BE             | 23.4         | 11.7           | 7.8           | 15.6            | 7.1            | 9.0           | 23.4            | 11.7           | 10.6          |
| SK             | 19.8         | 10.5           | 8.7           | 15.8            | 6.0            | 6.0           | 19.8            | 10.5           | 12.0          |
| UK             | 17.8         | 11.2           | 9.3           | 11.2            | 4.0            | 6.1           | 17.8            | 11.2           | 9.6           |
| ES             | 24.7         | 11.4           | 8.5           | 17.5            | 7.2            | 8.3           | 24.7            | 11.4           | 10.1          |
| GR             | 33.7         | 21.3           | 9.4           | 24.6            | 12.1           | 7.7           | 33.7            | 21.3           | 10.7          |
| TR             | 65.4         | 51.0           | 10.5          | n.a.            | n.a.           | n.a.          | n.a.            | n.a.           | n.a.          |

*Pre-Crisis, 2004-2008*

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.
Figure 3.5: Duration of NEET Status over the period 2011-2013 by Vulnerable Groups

Native Males

Native Females

Migrant Males

Migrant females

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

3.3.3. Part-time Employment

As it was evident in Figure 3.2, the share of employed among youth has declined over time, and considerably so in Spain and Greece. In Figure 3.6, we provide the employment shares decomposed into full- and part-time work. Young people lacking the experience are more likely to be hired as part-time employees rather than signing in full-time contracts. However, the practice changes across countries and across individual characteristics, particularly by gender and educational attainment.
The Netherlands and the UK stand out as two countries with a larger share of youth employed part-time, especially female part-timers constitute half of total employment in the former, and no less than 15% in the latter. Female migrants are also more likely to be part-time employed relative to natives. While having children or length of stay in the receiving country are important determinants, these do not explain satisfactorily the part-time employment of migrant women in these “old” migrant-receiving countries. It may rather be related to the unavailability of full-time employment, which is much more prevalent among migrant women than among native women. They have “double disadvantages” of intersectionality as migrants and women (Rubin et al. 2008)

Being employed also depends on the education level; the less educated having smaller chance to find employment either full- or part-time (Figure 3.7). In Spain and Greece, the share of those with a tertiary education is twice of those with less than upper secondary education. An interesting observation is that part-time employment is higher among more educated than less educated in the Netherlands, which might be a result of cultural preferences of the youth.
Box 3.3 Gender and Part-time work - evidence from the case study countries

Evidence from the national reports of the five case study counties confirms the total number of young people in part-time employment increased, with the number of young women working part-time increasing in Denmark, Spain, Greece and the UK, since the crisis.

In Denmark, just under 40% of young female workers worked part-time before 2008 – in 2014 it is over 50% percent. The percentage for young male part-time workers increased from around 22% before 2008 to just under 30% in 2014.

In Spain, young women are more likely to be in part-time employment (23.8% in 2006 and 35.1% in 2014 vs. 8.9% and 21% for males in the same years), some of which is involuntary. The overall share of involuntary part-time employment increased dramatically from 34.5% in 2006 to 68.5% in 2014. Rates remained slightly higher for young women than for young men, although the gap decreased during the crisis (2.5% in 2014 vs. 7.7% in 2006).

A similar pattern emerged in Greece where part-time and job rotation contracts significantly increased, most often on an involuntary basis. The rate of part-time employment for men aged 15-24 rose from 11.1% in 2006 to 18.1% in 2014, while for women of the same age it increased from 17.1% to about 25%. In the age group 25-29, part-time employment tripled among males and reached the EU-28 average (from 3.0% in 2006 to 9.4% in 2014), and doubled among females (from 9.7% to 18.0%; EU-28 average in 2014, 23.4%).

Similarly, in the UK there are marked gender differences in the share of young people in part-time employment. In 2014, the part-time employment rate for men aged 15-24 was 30.5% (EU average 24.2%) and for women was 46.4% (EU average 39.7%) (Eurostat, 2015). Although the UK has only a slightly higher than EU-28 rate for part-time employment as a percentage of total employment, it has a high proportion of people working very short part-time hours (i.e. less than 10 hours per week), many are students supporting themselves through their studies. Yet another dimension of part-time work in the UK is the growing number of young people who are on the widely publicised and highly controversial ‘zero hours contracts’, where the
number of hours worked is variable and set by the employer on the basis of demand. Young people aged 16-24 are over-represented among those employed on such contracts: 37% of those on ‘zero hours contracts’ are young people aged 16-24.

Source: Carstensen and Lyhne Ibsen (Denmark); Petmesidou and Polyzoidis (Greece); Tejero and González-Menéndez (Spain); Hadjivassiliou, Rickard and Swift (UK)

3.2.4 Examination of the probabilities of labour market status

In order to further the analysis we calculate the relative-risk rates for current self-reported labour market status of youth who are not students based upon multinomial logit estimations (see Annex 2). The dependent variable depicts four different states, being full-time employed (base state), being part-time employed, unemployed or inactive. Independent variables of interest are gender, migrant status, and education level and year dummies. We also control for age and years after finishing school, as an approximation for potential experience.

Our results show that the probability to be in part-time employment rather than to be fully employed is larger for native females in Denmark relative to the native males (base group) (Annex 2). On the other hand in Denmark and the Netherlands migrants are more vulnerable in terms of unemployment; they are less likely to transit to the employment than the natives, and perhaps not surprisingly, the most disadvantageous group in terms of unemployment is migrant females. In terms of inactivity females, whether migrant or not, are more likely to be inactive. The current economic crisis has hit non-western immigrants harder than native Dutch and other relatively less vulnerable western immigrants, as they were mostly holding temporary contracts with low-job security. They enter to welfare programs but the allocation of less money to ALMP due to cutbacks stigmatizes these groups, too (Zorlu 2013).

Unlike the universalistic regimes, in the employment-cantered countries, education is associated with greater opportunities to be in the full-time employment. However, in France and Belgium females and migrants are less likely to be in full-time employment than the native males. Similar to universalistic regimes, in the employment-centred cluster we observed that the migrant females are less likely to be in the employment regardless of their educational attainment. Even educated female migrants face difficulties while transiting from school to work. This finding is consistent with the literature which argues that disadvantaged youth are worse off in countries which can be characterized as less tightly structured by education. When education is weakly linked to the workplace and vocational education is obtained on the job disadvantaged groups can be more severely hurt (Gangl, 2001).

In the UK higher levels of education are associated with more chances of full-time employment. Again, as is the case in all other countries, males, are more likely to be unemployed or inactive in the UK. However, the interaction of gender and education variables shows interesting results such that educated migrant males are founded to be more likely to be unemployed or inactive (Annex 2).

An easy reading is that if the reported coefficient is greater than one, than individuals with that characteristic are more likely to be in the state relative to full-time employment than the base category. In any case, in Appendix A.1 we provide average predictive probabilities by gender and migrant status for three educational groups over time.
In Slovak Republic which is categorized as a post-socialist country, the trend is similar; highly educated young people are more likely to be in the full-time employment. In addition, as in other countries, females are more likely to be unemployed or inactive. Since the share of migrants is rather low in Slovakia, the statistically insignificant results are not presented in Annex 2 Panel e.

Lastly, we present the results for sub-protective countries, Spain, Greece and Turkey\(^{10}\) in the last three panels of the tables in Annex 2. In line with the other findings in this study, the results show that more educated young are more likely to be in the full-time employment. Once again, unemployment and inactivity are more common among women; and this is a more critical issue especially for the young migrant females. As in the case in the liberal cluster, educated young migrant males are found to be least likely to make a successful transition from school to work. Low vocational specify of educational system coupled with moderate degrees of labour protection in the sub-protective regime countries can explain these findings.

3.3 Summary

From our analysis, it can be said that males are more likely to drop out of school but Turkey is an outlier in this case. Migrants show the same trends as the young males that they are more likely to drop out of education. When cross-country comparisons are considered, the school leaving age is higher in universalistic countries, particularly in Denmark. Among the others, Spain shows the highest school drop-out rates for long due to the strong demand and high salaries for low-educated workers in certain sectors which disappeared with the crisis. Regarding school to work transition patterns, it will not be wrong to claim that the vulnerability has been reproduced among the discussed groups. That is, females and migrants are the ones who are more likely to be unemployed or inactive in all countries we considered.

\(^{10}\) In Turkish data, migrant status is not available.
4. Material Deprivation and Job Quality Outcomes

In this section we focus on vulnerabilities that include material deprivation and the impact of the household as well as quality outcomes on the labour market such as occupational status and income. The school-to-work transition could potentially be affected by two important vulnerability factors; the possibility to live with parents and to be materially deprived. For young people the household resources may provide a buffer against the external risks of vulnerability or among vulnerable households may reinforce existing vulnerabilities. However, such interactions can also create analytical complications in terms of the direction of casualty and endogeneity. While it is possible to identify whether a young person lives with his/her parents and whether he/she lives in a materially deprived household, we refrained from including them as explanatory variables in our analysis in section 3 since the direction of causality is not clear.

A young individual may have more choice whether or not to enter in the labour market or remain longer in unemployment if he receives parental support to help with job search (cf. Gökşen et. al., 2015). However, it is also likely that an individual who faces difficulties in the labour market may choose to go back to parental home if the resources and support are present (Kaplan, 2012; Ermisch, 1999). Similarly, material deprivation could be endogenous. We do not have information whether individuals in our data set grew up in a materially deprived household and the link with their current deprivation. Hence, although these factors are excluded from our regression analysis, we provide descriptive findings on the share of youth living in a materially deprived household (with or without parents) and share of youth living with parents and document their labour market outcomes.

4.1.1 Material Deprivation and labour market performance of vulnerable groups

The use of non-monetary indicators such as material deprivation helps to distinguish between situations of resilience where low income does not translate into material deprivation and situations of vulnerability where a fall in income results in a sustained period of material deprivation. Despite the concern that non-monetary indicators of deprivation may reflect choice or taste, the available evidence suggests that such indicators do contain valuable information that helps identify those experiencing exclusion due to lack of resources (Morrone et al. 2011). An ideal set of vulnerability indicators would include information on households’ assets availability, and basic deprivation (Morrone et al. 2011). Material deprivation is defined by Eurostat as the lack of resources.11 The severe material deprivation rate, in this definition, represents the proportion of people living in households that cannot afford at least four of the following nine items: mortgage or rent payments,

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11 For more detailed information please visit: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Material_deprivation
utility bills, hire purchase instalments or other loan payments; one week’s holiday away from home; meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day; unexpected financial expenses; a telephone (including mobile telephone); a colour TV; a washing machine; a car; and heating to keep the home sufficiently warm. Combining personal files of EU-SILC with household information we have classified each and every household either as a materially deprived or not.

Table 4.1 provides the share of households that experience material deprivation. We observe an increasing trend in the share of households that could not afford certain basic goods and services in all countries, except Turkey and the Slovak Republic which already had a higher level of deprivation. In Turkish case over 80% of the households cannot afford a holiday, over 60% cannot meet unexpected financial expenses, over 50% does not have a car and another 50% cannot meet unexpected financial expenses. The major reasons that Slovak households have a high deprivation scores is that they cannot afford a holiday (over 50%), and, despite declining trends, there is a high share of household unable to have proper meals (declined from 40% to 20%) and not having a car (declined from 30% to 18%). The reasons why the deprivation score has increased in Greece is now many households running short of their regular payments (increased from 33% to 43%), not being able to afford a holiday (50%) and cannot meet unexpected financial expenses (increased form low of 30% to 48%).

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<td>10.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>18.8</td>
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<td>18.2</td>
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<td>56.4</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

In Table 4.2 we provide statistics of youth that live in materially deprived households. Interestingly, the share of youth that live in materially deprived households is less than the share of all households that are deprived in all countries with the exception of Turkey. This suggest that material deprivation is more common among older-age households (Eurostat 2016). In the EU countries both the (elderly) dependency ratio and pressure for more government spending on pensions is increasing (Morrow and Roeger, 2002). Higher rate of deprived households among elderly might be a consequence of the lack of or low level of pension payments.
On one hand, the gender gap among native females and males living in deprived households is not large and country differences predominate. On the other hand, the share of migrant youth in deprivation is significantly higher than share of natives. Living in a materially deprived household is more common among females and migrants. We observe that migrant females are the group most vulnerable to the material deprivation. Furthermore, cross-country comparisons underline the fact that material deprivation is more of an issue in Turkey which has the lowest GDP per capita income among the countries analysed. Hence, all these figures about the vulnerability suggest that material deprivation is path dependent at both country and according to gender: material deprivation is highest among the already disadvantaged groups and in the lower income level countries.
Figure 4.1: Labour Market Status of Youth that Lives in Materially Deprived Households, Shares (%)

In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we present the labour market status of young people living in materially deprived households in order to elaborate more on the relationship between material deprivation and school to work transition among the vulnerable groups across countries. The results reveal that most of the young living in materially deprived households are jobless; i.e. either student, unemployed or NEET. That is, they have not successfully made the transition from school to work. Examination of the vulnerable groups, again, shows a similar pattern: among those living in the materially deprived households the most vulnerable ones are females and the situation is even worse for migrant females.

Cross-country comparison shows that in the UK, both migrant males and migrant females are better off than native males and native females. This might be a consequence of the higher educational attainment of some of these groups in the UK. However, we would like to note the following word of caution on causality. The young people might be more vulnerable to the employment because they are materially deprived or living in household that are materially deprived because they do not supply labour (or cannot supply labour).

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.
Figure 4.2: Labour Market Status of Youth that Lives in Materially Deprived Households, Shares (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full-Time Employment</th>
<th>Part-Time Employment</th>
<th>Not Employed</th>
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<tr>
<td>Native Females</td>
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<td><img src="image" alt="Chart" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant Males</td>
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<td><img src="image" alt="Chart" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant Females</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Chart" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Chart" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Chart" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.
4.1.2 Living with Parents and labour market outcomes

Table 4.3: Share of the Youth that co-resides with a Parent

|                  | Total | Native Males | Native Females | Migrant Males | Migrant Females |
|------------------|-------|--------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------
| **Post-Crisis, 2011-2013** |       |              |                |               |                 |
| DK               | 33.2  | 37.6         | 30.1           | 25.9          | 13.0           |
| NL               | 51.2  | 59.5         | 46.3           | 33.8          | 30.1           |
| FR               | 49.8  | 55.7         | 45.5           | 44.1          | 22.2           |
| BE               | 61.5  | 67.9         | 58.5           | 47.9          | 34.2           |
| SK               | 87.7  | 91.3         | 83.3           | 46.9          |                 |
| UK               | 55.7  | 63.8         | 51.0           | 38.8          | 31.8           |
| ES               | 73.9  | 80.0         | 74.3           | 63.2          | 46.0           |
| GR               | 75.4  | 84.1         | 69.8           | 70.8          | 47.2           |
| TR               | 67.0  | 78.9         | 53.1           |               |                 |
| **Crisis, 2009-2010** |       |              |                |               |                 |
| DK               | 34.6  | 39.7         | 30.8           | 31.0          | 17.0           |
| NL               | 50.5  | 58.9         | 46.0           | 31.8          | 19.2           |
| FR               | 49.7  | 54.4         | 46.1           | 49.6          | 29.5           |
| BE               | 59.3  | 67.2         | 56.5           | 39.5          | 26.0           |
| SK               | 84.7  | 88.6         | 80.1           | 100.0         | 0.0            |
| UK               | 60.0  | 70.0         | 55.0           | 31.9          | 29.4           |
| ES               | 71.0  | 78.2         | 70.7           | 54.7          | 43.0           |
| GR               | 72.6  | 82.0         | 67.3           | 66.9          | 38.4           |
| TR               | 66.3  | 78.1         | 52.6           |               |                 |
| **Pre-Crisis, 2005-2008** |       |              |                |               |                 |
| DK               | 32.4  | 36.3         | 28.3           | 44.8          | 19.5           |
| NL               | 50.2  | 58.3         | 44.3           | 37.2          | 24.4           |
| FR               | 45.9  | 51.7         | 41.5           | 37.9          | 25.3           |
| BE               | 58.1  | 65.0         | 55.2           | 41.1          | 28.6           |
| SK               | 82.6  | 86.5         | 78.6           | 47.2          | 72.1           |
| UK               | 55.5  | 64.8         | 51.8           | 32.2          | 28.4           |
| ES               | 74.0  | 79.8         | 73.9           | 45.1          | 37.6           |
| GR               | 72.5  | 81.5         | 67.2           | 62.0          | 40.1           |
| TR               | 65.3  | 77.4         | 50.9           |               |                 |

*Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.*

Living with parents might be a buffer against adverse conditions of the School to Work (STW), as well as a evidence of vulnerability. It is difficult to determine the direction of causality because of the endogeneity of the issue. Hence we provide here only the descriptive findings on STW patterns of young people by their living arrangements. The EU-SILC data contains information on whether an individual lives in a household with his/her parents. If a parent exists in the household we categorized that individual as “co-resident with parents”. Table 4.3 shows the share of youth that live at least with a parent. There is a heterogeneity across countries with Denmark having much fewer, around one third, young individuals that share a residence with their parents underlining the earlier transitions to
independent households in northern Europe (see Anxo et al. 2010. In contrast with Denmark, in the Slovak Republic more than 80% of young individuals live with their parents possibly because of the absence of proper employment protection laws in post-socialist countries (Blossfeld et al., 2005; Iannelli and Smith, 2008). The other countries lie in between, although the shares are also very high in southern countries where family is an important institution against financial and economic risks in the market in the absence of mature welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Anxo et al. 2010).

Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of students within those who live with their parents. Despite a large share of youth in the Slovak Republic who lives with their parents, only 40% of them are students, compared to Denmark where two thirds of those who live with their parents (32%) are students. In countries where we observe higher share of youth co-residing with their parents, higher share of them are also in full-time employment. In countries where we observe higher share of youth co-residing with their parents, higher share of them are also in full-time employment.

**Figure 4.3: Labour Market Status of those who lives with Parents, 2011-2013**

![Bar Chart](chart.png)

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

The descriptive statistics in Table 4.3 are also in line with the literature of household formation, that females are less likely to stay in their parental home than males (see e.g., Angelini and La Ferrere, 2013) and that the share of youth living with parents increases slightly during the crisis (similar results have been found for the US by Lee and Painter 2013). Migrants are also less likely to stay with their parents, and once again, this could be explained by their parents not being in the same country as these migrants.

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12 We report shares only in post-crisis period, however the Picture does not change when other sub-periods are used.
Figure 4.4: Labour Market Status of Young People that Live with Parents, Shares (%)

In Figure 4.4, the labour market status of those who live with parents are plotted before and after the crisis. Changing conditions not only increase the share of youth that lives with their parents, but also changes their employment composition. The share of full-time employed decreases and the share of unemployed increases, more so in the southern economies. Not surprisingly, native males are consistently more likely to be in full-time employment compared to migrant males across all countries. Native females similarly are more likely to be in full-time employment compared to migrant females, except in the case of Germany. Migrant females have the lowest shares in employment in Netherlands. It is argued that early selection for vocational and general education in Netherlands works to the disadvantage for migrant females (de Graaf and van Zenderen, 2009).

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.
4.2 Estimating Job Quality Outcomes across vulnerabilities

In this section, we again estimate a multinomial logit model to analyse occupation and wages of those who are employed, as low quality jobs and low wages may signal future prospects of the youth. Based on a ranking by Ganzeboom et al. (1992) we estimate a linear regression model for occupation and estimate a Mincerian wage equation to test how the level of pay varies among the vulnerable groups across the school to work regimes in our sample of countries.

4.2.1 Occupation as an indicator of labour market performance of vulnerable groups

One of the main indicators of socioeconomic position is the occupation of the individual. A “good” job not only improves the status of the individual in the society, but also provides better future prospects and career advancement for it serves as a better signal of ability or provides well-established and wider networks, among other things. Over the last two decades, advancements in technology has led to polarization of jobs and many mid-wage jobs in traditional industries were lost. Low-wage jobs, particularly in the service sector, became proportionally more abundant. As competition increased for high-wage jobs, those who enter labour market recently face greater difficulty to obtain better jobs. In this section we consider whether young women and men and particularly vulnerable groups among them face harder times to find high-quality jobs.

Ideally, one would like to examine the quality of the first job of young people. However, available data do not allow us to investigate this particular issue properly, and instead we use their current occupation. The EU-SILC data provides occupations in ISCO-08 classification. We matched all occupations to the International Socio-Economic Index developed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992) to measure the quality of jobs. The index runs between 10 and 80 and the higher the index value the higher is the quality of the job.

Using a simple linear regression model we estimate whether the quality of jobs depend on age group, gender and migrant status. Table 4.4 provides estimation results for each country. The base line group in the estimation consists of native male adults with less than upper secondary education.

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13 The Mincer earnings function is a single-equation model that explains earnings as a function of schooling and experience. The equation can be formally shown as:

\[ W_i = α + µS_i + δ EXP_i + ε_i \]

where; \( W_i \) is wages, \( S_i \) is years of schooling, \( EXP_i \) is potential experience of individuals, and \( ε_i \) is the error term. The variables of interest are \( α \) that describe different vulnerable groups.

14 The EU-SILC data identifies a person’s age of first significant job, but not qualifications of that first job, unless age in the survey year matches age of first job. We have limited and scattered data (for example, there is no information at all on the first job in the case of Denmark, and in France data on the age of first job have not been collected in later years) to conduct a reasonable and reliable estimation.

15 Earlier versions of SILC data use ISCO-88 classification at a more aggregate level. Starting from 2011, the classification is switched to ISCO-08 with a larger set, namely 52, of occupations and provides a better match with ISEI. Therefore, the regressions reported are for 2011-2013 period. We do not have occupation information in Turkish data.
The results indicate that young people relative to adults are more likely to have a low quality job after controlling for (potential) experience and education level. While the coefficient of being young is significant for all countries (except the Slovak Republic) it is smaller in Denmark. Females in general are more likely to have low scored occupations, yet young females recuperate some of the loss in the Netherlands, France, the UK and Greece.

In all countries occupational scores of adult migrants are lower than adult natives, more so for migrant females than migrant males. However, the situation is reversed for young migrant males in most countries, particularly in France. One plausible explanation is that the estimation is based on the condition that these individuals are able to find a job and their unobserved qualifications may have compensated for any difficulties in finding work due to being a migrant. Considering that being in full-time employment is less likely for migrants, particularly those who are less educated, those in our sample are a subset of individuals.

**Table 4.4: Quality of Occupations across Vulnerabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>FR</th>
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<th>SK</th>
<th>UK</th>
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<td>-1.987**</td>
<td>0.141**</td>
<td>-3.752**</td>
<td>-3.416**</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-0.606**</td>
<td>-2.544**</td>
<td>-1.351**</td>
<td>1.023**</td>
<td>-0.995**</td>
<td>-1.349**</td>
<td>-1.602**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Migrant Male</td>
<td>2.089**</td>
<td>0.336**</td>
<td>8.748**</td>
<td>6.079**</td>
<td>-2.824**</td>
<td>4.077**</td>
<td>4.548**</td>
<td>4.257**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Migrant Female</td>
<td>-2.659**</td>
<td>6.617**</td>
<td>5.184**</td>
<td>-4.437**</td>
<td>3.437**</td>
<td>1.955**</td>
<td>18.562**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Secondary</td>
<td>4.984**</td>
<td>7.110**</td>
<td>4.691**</td>
<td>4.094**</td>
<td>7.790**</td>
<td>7.331**</td>
<td>5.194**</td>
<td>7.812**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr. After Grad.</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
<td>0.031**</td>
<td>0.153**</td>
<td>-0.232**</td>
<td>0.352**</td>
<td>0.262**</td>
<td>-0.289**</td>
<td>0.047**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sq. Yr. After Grad.</td>
<td>0.001**</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td>-0.008**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>33.905**</td>
<td>37.247**</td>
<td>33.141**</td>
<td>33.920**</td>
<td>27.915**</td>
<td>33.381**</td>
<td>38.135**</td>
<td>31.882**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>66,387</td>
<td>113,103</td>
<td>117,561</td>
<td>67,343</td>
<td>84,631</td>
<td>92,200</td>
<td>167,517</td>
<td>70,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** and * denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Estimation uses population weights.

Baseline category is adult native males with less than upper secondary education.

Estimation includes year dummies (not reported here).
4.2.2 Wage as an indicator of labour market performance of vulnerable groups

In addition to the quality of jobs we provide another estimation of quality outcomes by estimating a standard Mincerian hourly wage equation based on information of salary income, number of months being full-time employed, usual weekly working hours during the reference period. Independent variables are as before, gender, migrant status, age group, education level and (potential) experience. The model also includes occupation score and time dummies. These results are reported in Figure 4.5 and annex 3.

Figure 4.5: Predicted Relative Wage Differences across Vulnerable Groups

*Relative to Adult Males

Source: Own calculations on EU-SILC using cross-sectional population weights of those who are over 16.

We find that young males are earning between 7% (in Slovakia) and 22% (in the UK) less than adult males. The wage gap between adult males and adult females is lowest in Belgium (6%) and highest in the Slovak Republic (25%). The wage gap between young males and females is largest in the Slovak Republic.

The relative wages of migrants are also lower in most countries, although young migrants earn more than adult migrants, except in the case of Denmark. In the UK and Greece, young migrants are earning significantly higher than any other group. Note that, in the UK migrants had already a higher education than anywhere else, and this result is likely to be driven we have very few observations on young migrants with lower education in this country.

The other variables in these analyses have expected signs (annex 3). Expected wage increases with potential experiences at a decreasing rate, while individuals with a university degree are earning 20-35% more than those who have less than upper secondary education. The largest university premium in Europe is in Greece where individuals with a tertiary degree making 46% more than least educated and almost 30% more than high school graduates.

16 The dependent variable is log of hourly wages for those who are employed full-time, has reported positive salary income and has usual working hours less than 85 in a week.
In Turkey gender gap in earnings is close to the one observed in the Slovak Republic, although the age premium is in the middle range compared to other countries in the sample. The major difference of Turkish labour market is that the premium of education is much higher than anywhere else as a consequence of diminishing returns to education is still not in effect as the average level is significantly low.

4.3 Summary

From our analysis of job quality outcomes we again find that females and migrants are the ones who are more likely to be disadvantaged. Furthermore, even if these groups have the “privilege to be employed” the quality of jobs they are hired for and the level of their wage are lower.

School-to-work transitions remain highly differentiated and vary widely across young people with different levels of education; educational attainment is typically the most powerful objective predictive of transitions. Young people who leave education with few qualifications have the greatest difficulty in making the transition. These differences interact with, and often compound other inequalities in transitions including those associated with gender, ethnicity and social class. These differences coupled with country’s institutional and structural arrangements which generates a particular “logic” (Walther, 2006) shape transition outcomes such as unemployment rates and types of employment.

Our findings, despite large country specific differences, generally show that transitions are somewhat smoother and more predictable in systems where the education and training system have already differentiated young people both horizontally and vertically into tracks leading to different labour market destinations. There is a link between occupational labour market systems and education and training systems that are standardized, stratified and vocationally specific. Transitions are smoother where the flows of information between education and labour market are continuous and extensive as in the case of employment-centred regimes. In regimes where education systems are less stratified and where linkages between education and labour market are weaker transitions seem to be more interrupted. Gender and social inequalities are expected to be less acute. However, our results show that under all regime types female migrants are the most disadvantaged group. Considering our focus on gender, the countries we investigated in this report are characterized by gender stratification in the form of high rates of female access to education, but with a high degree of gender segregation in labour market institutions. Market success is not only related to level of education but also the other factors exclusion such as migrant status that make the association between education and labour market entry more complex.

Applying a typology of welfare regimes to the comparison of youth transition contexts, specifically across vulnerabilities, captures some of the variation in national transitional systems, but they leave substantial variation unaccounted for mostly because typologies were not developed specifically to explain national differences in school-to-work transitions. As argued by Bucholtz et al., (2009, p.67) the country-specific differences can be understood in that institutions and social structures are interwoven with a high degree of internal complementarity. They can only be grasped adequately in their totality as country-specific institutional packages.
5. Policies Context and measures for vulnerable women and men

5.1 Introduction

This section of the report presents an analysis of school to work transitions in five case study countries: Spain, Greece (sub-protective countries), France (employment-centred), Denmark (universalistic), and the UK (liberal) with particular attention paid to vulnerable groups discussed in the previous section, namely migrants, women and men, and materially deprived groups. It will particularly focus on how these different regimes influence schooling and school to work transitions for these disadvantaged groups with a view to potential policy transfer.

Following section is based on information gathered from the country reports written for both Policy Performance, and Barriers and Triggers of Policy Innovation work packages of the STYLE project (WP3) and specific contributions from members of the WP4 teams namely:

- M B. Carstensen and C Lyhne-Ibsen (Denmark)
- K Bheemaiah and M Smith (France)
- M Petmesidou and P Polyzoidis (Greece)
- A. Tejero and M. C. González-Menéndez (Spain)
- K P Hadjivassiliou, C Rickard and S Swift (UK)

We discuss each country case in turn

5.2 Country Cases

5.2.1 Denmark

Denmark, as a social democratic welfare model that places the individual rights and responsibilities within collective social responsibility, represents universalistic regime characterized by comprehensive educational system with minimal streaming and flexible training possibilities (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Counselling is highly institutionalized in all stages of education, training and employment and it thus facilitates school to work transitions (Walther 2006). Compared to many other European economies, Danish youth have indeed experienced relatively low long-term youth unemployment – being out of work for over a year - rates following the crisis; 14.2 % in 2011, which is much lower than the EU-average % 22.8 even during the crisis years (Crowley et al. 2013). The dropout rate from compulsory education is low, around 5%. Furthermore the role of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) and the prominent position of VET systems should be emphasized for the relatively low rate of dropouts and youth unemployment rates. Denmark reserves the highest
proportion of GDP among the OECD countries for the policies such as improving and supporting job 
search and improving qualifications and employability through vocational training and education 
(Carstensen and Ibsen 2015). The VET system is based on the combined dual training principle in 
school and work. With the high involvement of employers in training, VET system supports a 
collectivist skill formation system process (Crowley et al. 2013).

Despite these achievements, the link between socioeconomic background and educational trajectory 
of the children is still stronger in the Danish educational system than that of Swedish and Finnish. 
Compared to their native Danish peers, immigrant students face greater challenges in reaching the 
same levels in compulsory education and in completing their upper secondary education successfully. 
For example, only 39% of the students from disadvantaged background are expected to complete 
VET program, whereas this rate is 51% for native Danish students, and, comparatively, the 
completion rates are greater for immigrant female, 47%, than 30% for male, which shows that the 
latter group is particularly disadvantaged in education (Nusche, Wurzburg, and Naughton, 2010).

The lack of apprenticeship positions in companies is argued to cause many students, particularly 
male immigrant backgrounds, to drop out before getting a degree; only half of the students enrolled in 
vocational training complete the program (Ingholt et al. 2015). The scarcity of company-based 
apprenticeship further hinders attracting the best and brightest students and this results gradually in 
VET being seen as a sort of ‘dead end’ for young people – an option for those who cannot manage a 
tertiary education. As elsewhere these factors altogether hurt the reputation of vocational education 
(Cederberg and Hartsmar 2013).

In order to address these challenges and increase the quality, Danish VET has been reformed in 
2014 – called ‘Better and more attractive vocational education’. The reform aims to increase the 
reputation of vocational education. However, the introduction of grade requirements for entering 
vocational education potentially undermines its role of social integration for the youth from working 
class and disadvantaged background (Carstensen and Ibsen, 2015). in this way, young people with 
low-income parents and with immigrant backgrounds are more likely to leave the education without 
any qualification and this situation marginalizes them in the labour market further (Rasmussen and 
Jensen, 2014).

For the Danish case Carstensen and Ibsen (2016) suggest that labour market policy has given 
relatively little consideration to gender differences since there has traditionally been little difference 
between youth unemployment rates for men and women. They argue that it is not surprising that 
gender mainstreaming has played a minor role in policy approaches towards issues such as youth 
unemployment and school-to-work-transitions. Indeed there is no specific legislation that targets the 
intersection of gender and age. However, overarching equality legislation does have an impact: three 
particular pieces of legislation target non-discrimination based on gender (and other issues): 1) 
Ligebehandlingsloven which implements the equal treatment EU-directive, 2) Ligelønsloven (equal 
pay act) and 3) Barselsorlov (parental leave act). Equally various collective agreements include 
provisions for equal treatment between men and women but with a focus on the workplace for 
example most agreements provide additional rights for paid parental leave.

In recent years, a number of policies have been developed in order to tackle gender differences in 
educational choices, high drop-out rates, and the problems faced by ethnic minority boys in finding 
apprenticeships in vocational education. According to the Ministry for Children, Education and Gender
Equality, cultural stereotypes act to limit some young people from applying to certain occupations and educational programmes with impacts upon resources, talent development and gender pay gaps. As such there have been political initiatives focused on changing perceptions of such education programmes via information campaigns and the use of student councillors to address gender issues.

The situation of young ethnic minority groups in Denmark has attracted significant political attention. The Ministry for Children, Education and Gender Equality has taken a number of initiatives to address the socialisation of young boys and girls from ethnic minority backgrounds, particularly with respect to the choice of education and occupation. These measures include the challenges for these young people to participate in less prestigious education programmes since family pressures valorise high prestige education programmes such as engineering, medicine and law.

Equally a number of government initiatives have been directed towards a separate yet related issue pertaining to young ethnic minority boys' high dropout rates from vocational educational programmes – here the dropout rate is around twice that other young men. These dropout rates are compounded by discrimination and difficulties in obtaining apprenticeships, here again ethnic minority boys lag significantly behind other boys. These issues were a key element of the government's action for the period 2011 and 2014 and continue to be on the agenda for the incoming 2015 government. On the other hand for young women a recent political agreement is relevant. A December 2014 agreement for au-pairs aims to increase their salaries and limit their working hours - typically, au-pairs are young women from non-Western countries are at risk of becoming vulnerable if treated badly.

5.2.2 France

Unlike Denmark, France represents an employment-centered regime, in which the state, despite becoming less prominent due to recent deregulation, privatization decentralization processes, shapes greatly school to work transition as the key stakeholder (Walther 2006). Here, compared to the universal regime that offers broad second chance options to individuals to orient them to regular and recognized options, the employment centered model tends to interpret incapacity of youth for the labour market with learning and social deficits (Walther 2006).

Comparatively, youth unemployment is higher levels in France: 23.8% in France and 16.3% in OECD countries in 2013 (OECD 2014). Youth unemployment is particularly damaging for young people from disadvantaged working class and ethnic minority backgrounds (Manfredi, Sonnet, and Scarpetta 2010). Equally the French labour market is highly polarized between relatively protected CDI contracts and more precarious CDD contracts and those, who do not achieve baccalaureate, are concentrated in jobs with the CDD contracts (Smith, Toraldo, and Pasquier, 2015). The link between socioeconomic background and educational achievement in the French educational system is quite strong. The children of North African, sub-Saharan African and Turkish immigrants fail and leave school more often than their native French counterparts and this results in a concentration in the secondary labour market (Alba, Sloan, and Sperling, 2011).

The recent policy innovations, for example ‘The hope for Suburbs plan’, ‘The Emergency Plan for Youth Employment’, and ‘Acting for Youth’ plan have specifically targeted young people from underprivileged areas (banlieues) such as early dropouts from a migrant/ethnic minority background (Eurofond 2014). This particular focus can also be linked to the unrest of youth in French ‘banlieu’ in
2005 and the social tensions caused was an important trigger for policy actions in France (Audebert 2013). It is interesting to note that the young people joined protests specifically-targeted schools for pillage and arson with some suggesting that they were angry at the broken promises regarding social mobility (for example Siberman, 2011).

In addition to number of programs at various scales at national level, some programs have also been initiated at supranational level in France in order to combine education and training with employment, guidance and counselling for disadvantaged young jobseekers such as well-known Youth Guarantee (YG) program and the Ecole de Deuxième Chance - Second Opportunity School. Despite some positive results, these solutions are evaluated as expensive and inefficient in the long run for youth employability (Roger and Zamora, 2011). The weak involvement of French employers in the STW system and ‘institutional statis’ that stems from the central role of state are pointed out as the barriers for the policy transfer and implementation (Smith, Toraldo, and Pasquier, 2015)

For the French case Bheemaiah and Smith (2016) point out that the labour market approach includes polices aimed at equality, gender, youth and vulnerable groups but there is limited integration of gender differences across other policies areas. While France has been at the forefront of reducing gender inequality – for example the Law 1486 in 2004 promotes equality between men and women, and the Law of August 4, 2014 "real equality between women and men" (Les inégalités entre les femmes et les hommes en France, 2015) there is limited explicit recognition of the youth dimension. Instead these laws addressed issues such as parental leave, protection for victims of violence, parity in new decision-making bodies, and agreements in enterprises for professional equality. In fact the focus is to combat gender inequality in the professional sphere, public and private.

Whilst neither the 2004 and 2014 laws addresses the issue of youth, equality and youth issues are addressed in the Act for Equal opportunities (2006). This was in response to situations of inequality and discrimination affecting people in difficult neighbourhoods. Two of the five objectives were aimed at youth - promoting the employment of young people living in deprived urban areas, and establishing a voluntary civil service for the acquisition of a civic and vocational training (Plan pour l’égalité professionnelle, 2015). The act encouraged "junior learning" from the age of 14: the first phase being an introduction to trades, and the next phase an apprenticeship contract. During the crisis, these laws and policies continued to embrace a wider range of (non-youth) issues to focus on improving opportunities for women in higher offices, both in government and business. Similarly a number of laws and policies have been directed towards vulnerable groups – persons with disabilities – but youth and gender dimension was not visible.

Whilst there have been a high number of youth-related policies and initiatives (see Smith et al., 2015), the ‘Enactment of the law relating to future jobs’ (Oct 2012) is one of the few measures which aims to end the distortion in access to sectorial contracts between young women and men (16-25). This was targeted at avoiding a systematic orientation of feminizing certain sectors that goes the furthest in addressing the intersection of gender, youth and employment. Also with respect to youth and gender, the report of the High Council of the People and the Family (2006) aimed to address teenage pregnancy by advocating free and anonymous contraception for minors.
5.2.3 The United Kingdom

In contrast to universalistic and employment-centered regimes, the UK’s STW regime values individual rights and responsibility above collective provisions, and sees youth as a transition that should end quickly with economic independence (Ballantine and Spade, 2015). The labour market is structured with high degree of flexibility and, therefore, it provides individuals with multiple entry points, yet, this flexibility comes at the expense of security (Billett, 2012). Although youth unemployment in the UK presently is around 16.1%, which is lower than the EU28 average of 21.5%, the UK is characterised by faster and unstable STW transitions. However there is evidence that these transitions in the UK have become lengthier and more uncertain (Hadjivassiliou et al., 2015).

In the UK, youth tend to stay in education rather than entering the labour market at an early age. However, despite the long time spent in education, similar to its Dutch counterpart, the UK also debates whether its own educational system generates skill mismatches at the labour market with some differences. The educational system is criticized as to whether it equips young people with an appropriate or sufficient skills; if it provides too little vocational provision at post-secondary level and, if the VET policy is too focused on basic skills and relatively low-level qualifications (Hadjivassiliou et al., 2015). Among others, these criticisms are linked to the low level of employer engagement with vocational education and poor internship conditions, which can turn internship into ‘dead end’ rather than a ‘stepping stone’ to stable employment (Hadjivassiliou et al., 2015).

One particularly striking factor is the strong intergeneration cycle of disadvantage; there is a strong correlation between being low skilled, unemployed and coming from lower income families (Hadjivassiliou et al. 2015). Similar to Greece and Spain, the current economic crisis also impacted upon manufacturing sectors in the UK and this has created greater difficulty for the integration of male youth from disadvantaged background into the labour market – not surprisingly male youth unemployment is higher than that of female in the UK (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010).

In contrast with other countries, vulnerability is not directly correlated with immigration or minority status in the UK; the unemployment rates between natives and immigrants have for example not proportionally changed with the crisis (Papademetriou et al., 2010). Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrant groups have been hit particularly hard by the economic crisis. However, Indians fared relatively better (Papademetriou et al., 2010). The fact that Indians are generally concentrated in jobs requiring higher levels of education shows how the current economic crisis has impacted upon the sectors to which low qualified youth have traditionally used to integrate (see section 4 of this report).

Another striking issue is the low performance of the native-born descendants of minority immigrants such as second-generation workers from black African, black Caribbean, and Pakistani/Bangladeshi ethnic groups both in education and the labour market. The reasons for this are not fully clear but some research suggest employer discrimination (Hills et al., 2010) and persistent inequality between generations in a low-income mobility conditions (D’Addio, 2007).

For the UK case Hadjivassiliou, Rickard and Swift (2016) identify policy initiatives aimed at youth and vulnerable youth as falling within two key areas -- early school leaving, and School to Work (STW)
transitions. In 2011 the UK Government announced two core strategies related to young people: the ‘Building Engagement, Building Futures’ strategy (to increase the support for the young people aged 16-24 and engaged in education, training and work and address risks of long term disengagement and the ‘Positive for Youth’ strategy to integrate across government and agencies policies for youth aged 13-19. Although these policy approaches call for equality of opportunity across gender and other equality strands Hadjivassiliou et al. (2016) find that there is no clear evidence of gender mainstreaming. Overall UK policy approaches towards vulnerable youth and the STW transition from a gender perspective fall into two areas - policies tackling early school leaving and facilitating the transitions into employment.

There have been a number of initiatives aimed at tackling early school leaving. Since 2015 the minimum age for leaving education or training has been raised to 18 which has an implicit gender dimension in that keeping young women in education or training may, in turn, reduce the teenage fertility rate. In fact the UK government has put a series of measures in place in order to prevent early school leaving and keep pregnant teenagers in education. The evidence suggests that these schemes improve the education levels of young mothers and their opportunities so reducing the risk of them becoming NEET.

Similarly, since 2013, the requirement that students remain in education into 18 even if they fail to pass the GCSEs in English and maths (examinations at 15-16 years). Here it is young boys who are likely to be impacted as girls tend to perform better in GCSE English and maths than their male counterparts, particularly those from disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As for other recent flagship measures of the UK Government towards disengaged youth – the Youth Contract and the Pupil Premium there was little evidence of the consideration of gender.

In 2012, responsibility for the delivery of careers guidance was to transferred to schools who contract with the national careers services (NCS) However, there has been concern about the funding available to schools and the impact of the new contracting arrangements on young people, especially NEETs. There are, however, some information initiatives with a clearer gender dimension – such as ‘Inspiring the Future’ which aims to tackle gender segregation and challenging gender stereotypes. The Study Programme for 16-19 year olds also includes a commitment for ‘substantial and meaningful’ work experience. As in other case study countries the development of entrepreneurial skills for women has received some priority via programmes such as the ‘Women’s Start-Up’.

There are a number of measures aimed at facilitating the STW transition for vulnerable young people although the gender dimension is not always outlined. Local authorities provide support to vulnerable groups such as young people with learning difficulties and/or disabilities, those leaving care, teenage mothers and NEETs. The ‘Early Intervention Grant’ enables local authorities to direct funds towards the most effective services and approaches for young people in their area. This programme operates through a “payment-by results model”, so that providers are incentivised to find employment for participants with the seriously disadvantaged receiving priority referrals. The Local Enterprise Partnerships across England have been asked to use the ESF to tackle the barriers that lead to youth unemployment in order to help young NEETs or at risk of becoming NEET.
5.2.4 Spain

Together with other Southern European countries such as Italy and Portugal and Greece, Spain represents sub-protective transition regime, which is typically characterized by low percentage of standard work places and high share of unprotected living conditions (Walther, 2006). Therefore, the family and informal economy play major roles in this regime type (Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011) (see also section 4 of this report). Typically vocational training is not well developed and the involvement of the companies in vocational training is weak (Leccardi and Ruspini, 2006).

Spain is indeed one of the most effected countries by the current economic crises. There are about one million people aged between 15 and 24 out of employment and the country has 53% of youth unemployment, which is more than double of the EU average, that is 23 % in 2012 (Eichhorst, Hinte, and Rinne, 2013). The high dropout rate from compulsory secondary education, which is almost doubles the EU average 24.9% (González-Menéndez et al., 2015). Furthermore 20% percentage of youth are in NEET status (Eichhorst, Hinte, and Rinne, 2013) with low qualified youth in a particularly fragile situation.

The high dropout and NEET rates make school-to-work transitions quite heterogeneous, non-linear and unpredictable (Bradley and Devadason, 2008). Nevertheless, a close look at the socio-demographic characteristics of the low qualified youth shows that these fragmented and individualized transitions are greatly shaped by structural conditions such as social class, gender and ethnicity (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010). To explain, first, the unemployment is positively correlated with low educational profile of parents, particularly mother, second, the greater percentage of unemployed people were born in other countries (26.2% vs. 15.3%), particularly Africa (15.4% vs. 2.1%), third, 21.5% of young people without qualifications arrived between 2002 and 2009, primarily from countries outside the European Union, and fourth, the unemployment is mainly a male phenomenon; 60% male vs. 45.6% females (Salvà-Mut, Thomás-Vanrell, and Quintana-Murci, 2015).

In response to these difficulties in the STW transition a range of programs have been developed at national and international levels. Two important ones are YG program and dual apprenticeship system in specific regions (based upon the Germany model). However, it is doubtful whether the former will generate the expected results and it is too soon to evaluate the success of the latter as the program is in its earlier stages of implementation (Piqué, Veà and Strecker 2015).

From a gender perspective the Spanish case-study contribution from Tejero and González-Menéndez underlines the importance of Law 3/2007 that established a commitment “for effective equality between women and men” and requires a strategy to gender mainstreaming in policy (see also González-Menéndez and Martínez-González, 2012). As such women are recognised as vulnerable workers, and specific measures are required to fight the gendered risks. As with many policies in Spain it is important to distinguish between the pre-crisis and crisis periods and this applies equally to gender mainstreaming in the labour market and the youth labour market.

Prior to the crisis period, gender mainstreaming was being increasingly being adopted in Spain and there had been a clear effort to recognise the gender gaps on the labour market and to design measures to address them. However, in practice only one of the four steps of gender mainstreaming – data collection on the position of women and men - was fully adopted (EC, 2008; Plantenga et al., 2007). Nevertheless there were considerable efforts were made to improve gender awareness and
expertise in some sectors (especially in the public sector) in order to make stakeholders and take responsibility for gender mainstreaming.

During this pre-crisis period, Plantenga et al, 2007 identify that efforts were directed mainly towards four key areas (a) assuring the presence of women in all labour market measures; (ii) reducing social security contributions for employing women on open-ended contracts with the aim to reduce levels of inactivity; (iii) offering women better qualifications via training programmes; and (iv) protecting specific vulnerable groups of women (for example, victims of violence). Other measures were more directly linked to labour market segmentation and aim at reducing the high rate of temporary contracts among women by reducing social security contributions for open-ended contracts. Prior to the crisis period these measures were aimed at all women who could work without a specific focus on reducing gender gaps on the youth labour market.

The situation changed somewhat during the crisis and Tejero and González-Menéndez identify two different periods to gender mainstreaming in relation to youth labour market policies -- before and after implementation of the national Strategy for Youth Entrepreneurship and Employment. Before implementation of this strategy, there was a specific measure aimed at reducing the rate of women in temporary employment and segmentation. This measure effectively subsidised young women working in a male-dominated sector by 100€ more than contracts for male workers (“Contrato indefinido de apoyo a emprendedores”). There was a similar incentive to convert a temporary contracts into open-ended ones.

During the second crisis period, the national Youth Guarantee (YG) system built on the national Strategy for Youth Entrepreneurship and Employment (González Menéndez et al, 2015). This was the main framework to analyse whether mainstreaming was being implemented among policies oriented towards Spanish youth. Unfortunately the evidence suggests that neither the national strategy nor the YG programme implemented gender mainstreaming, or included specific measures to reduce gender gaps among young people. In fact the only consideration of gender was observed in the difference between the age-limits for access to the YG – while young women and other vulnerable groups could access the schemes up to the age of 35 years young men had to be under 30 years.

5.2.5 Greece

Similar to Spain, Greece bears typical characteristics of a sub-protective STW regime and like Spain it has also been most adversely affected by the economic crisis. However, unlike Spain, youth unemployment was already high in Greece even before the recession. It was 22.9 % when EU average was 15.7 % in 2007 and has risen to 58.3% in 2013 when EU average was 23.4% (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis, 2015). The crises dramatically increased unemployment across all working-age groups.

Greece is one of the countries where there is a strong link between family background and school achievement (Van de Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010). However, the regional differences in relation educational inequalities are particularly striking (Martins and Veiga, 2010). The dropout rates, employment and living standards vary among the regions greatly (Kyridis et al., 2011). Socially disadvantaged groups such as Roma, immigrants and members of the Muslim minority of Thrace heavily populate the regions, which have high dropout rates and unemployment levels (Spinthourakis
et al., 2008). The low educated and low qualified youth, most of the minority youngster are groups who have been hit particularly hard by the recession, as jobs disappeared in the sectors of manufacturing and retail trade (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis, 2015).

However, unlike many other European countries, the low qualified youth is not the only group badly affected by the recession in Greece. Strikingly, Greek youth with tertiary education were also a group for concern before and after the crisis due to the long-term qualification mismatch in STW regime. The crisis exacerbated the qualification mismatch further, which was exacerbated as a high share of university graduates taking up jobs requiring low qualifications and high share of brain-drain (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis, 2015). It is worth noting that there is a strong gender differential in the Greek STW transition regime since females face a significantly higher probability of unemployment at every level, compared to men with similar characteristics (Mitrakos, Tsakloglou, and Ioannis, 2010).

In response to these difficulties, a range of policy programs have been initiated/transferred in Greece such as VET reform on the basis of German- Greek agreement, mutual learning program and YG to improve the practical skills of young job seekers. Some studies show that despite their shortcomings, trainees considered these programs beneficial for skill formation, particularly young women (Panitsidou, Vastaki, and Valkanos, 2012). However, the data are still scarce for evaluating the effects of these policies. We should also mention the widespread pessimism among the experts about the potential success of these policy transfer programs within the conditions of deep economic crises (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis, 2015).

The context for gender equality policy has been particularly challenging. The National Programme for Substantive Gender Equality 2010-2013 (Ministry of the Interior/GSGE 2010) shapes the policy towards gender mainstreaming across policy fields. In employment, Petmesidou and Polyzoidis point to the stated emphasis focused of the Ministry of the Interior on counselling and support of “employed women, self-employed women and owners of small enterprises with the aim of upgrading their knowledge and skills in order to improve their labour market status”, as well as work life balance measures (p. 16). Although there are specific interventions for “the Support of Women’s Entrepreneurship” none are particularly target young women.

On the other hand the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism implemented a programme for the “Support of Youth Entrepreneurship” assisting young men and women 19-40 years in order to help establish new enterprises. Here there is particular consideration of young unemployed women from the General Secretariat of Youth (in the Ministry of Education) under the programme “Gates for Youth Entrepreneurship” – this supports entrepreneurial endeavour in cultural, environmental and social activities. Similarly the programmes “Youth in Action” and “European Youth Card”, the General Secretariat of Youth conducted information campaigns aimed at young women and women’s organisations.

During the crisis, there was more limited evidence of a gender dimension to key measures aimed at the youth labour market: neither measures focussed on enhancing job retention and the adaptability of workers and enterprises, nor the use of “reintegration vouchers” (a subsidy to potential employers) paid particular attention to gender aspects. Subsequently, the EU Youth Initiative led to the development of a more targeted effort towards unemployed youth including the labour market entry voucher for young people up to 29 years of age and the community-service programme. These schemes were neither solely targeted at young people nor differentiated on a gender basis. Indeed
elements of the Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan did not particularly touch on the gender dimension (see Petmesidou and Polyzoidis, 2015; Petmesidou and González, 2016). Overall there have been few specific interventions addressing the female youth labour market (or more widely to unemployed women of all ages) and most policy measures towards unemployed young people implemented at the national level do not particularly differentiate in terms of gender although there were a few exceptions at the local level (see below).

5.3 Gender Mainstreaming of Youth labour market policy

Our analyses in section 5.2 confirms that the recognition of gender differences among young people has not always been visible in policy development and implementation so in this section we are particularly interested in examples where the gender dimension has been (partially) considered in order to highlight the possibilities for innovation and learning. Although the extent of gender mainstreaming has been limited it is nevertheless important to examine some of the policy instruments for narrowing the gender gap in the school-to-work transitions in more detail. We focus again on our five case study countries.

Gender mainstreaming is an approach to policy making that aims to avoid negative consequences for gender equality in all policy making and indeed to ensure that all policy making works towards closing gender gaps. According to the European Commission, gender mainstreaming is “not restricting efforts to promote equality to the implementation of specific measures, but mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality” (EC, 1996). The principle being that “policies always have an impact on women and men where they involve the citizen, the economy and society” (EC, 2008: 9). The evidence suggests that at progress towards widespread implementation has at best been weak (Smith and Villa, 2012; Plantenga et al., 2007).

Gender mainstreaming of policies towards young people gender mainstreaming would offer individuals and society many advantages since addressing gender gaps early in the life course could help avoid gender gaps opening up and the long-term consequences of inequality. Gender mainstreaming relies on four key steps: firstly, that policy makers in all domains, including economic policies, and at all levels to take ownership for closing gender gaps; secondly that the analysis of gender differences through the use of gender disaggregated statistics is incorporated into policy development; thirdly, that gender impact assessment of policies is undertaken for their impacts upon women and men and likelihood for closing gender gaps; and finally that evaluations and revisions of policy to ensure closing of gender gaps and avoid unintended consequences. This is a complex process that has been difficult to implement at both European and national level (Fagan et al., 2008).

5.4 Gender Mainstreaming at the Country Level

As we have seen above, with few exceptions, gender mainstreaming has not been systematically applied to youth labour market policies in the case-study counties considered in this report. Furthermore even where there was evidence of good intentions and gender mainstreaming was initiated, progress was diminished by the crisis. In this sense it is important to distinguish between a gender component to policy versus gender mainstreaming to gain a better idea of good practice gender interventions in youth labour market policies.
It is important to review what constitutes good practice, going beyond the inclusion of a gender component. In virtually all cases, good practices include targeted interventions which have successfully defined a vulnerable group(s), a holistic approach that not only addresses complexity but provides a range of interventions in response and offers relevant, or locally adapted solutions, and a participative approach to include stakeholder participation and often the use of role models.

There are a number of examples where policies do recognise gender differences among migrant populations. In Greece and Denmark, good policy examples include a gender component but are not necessarily examples of gender mainstreaming in youth labour. In fact Greece, Denmark, the UK and Spain all identified targeted interventions as an element of good practice. For example, activities to support Muslim minority children and youth, in the region of Thrace, Greece in order to continue education at the secondary level (Box 5.1). In Denmark a task force to help more young people (especially young males) from socially disadvantaged environments and from ethnic minorities to enrol and finish vocational programmes, increasing participation of women, disadvantaged youth, and ethnic minorities (Box 5.2).

Box 5.1 Gender and Ethnicity - evidence from Greece
In Greece, the Muslim minorities of Thrace (from three ethnic groups: those of Turkish origin, the Muslim Roma and the Pomaks) have persistently faced multiple barriers to complete compulsory education, ranging from poverty and social exclusion vis-à-vis the “majority” (Christian native) population and the Muslim minority of Turkish origin, to age discrimination due to intermittent school attendance, low performance and repetition of courses, often resulting in these students being in lower secondary education at least three years behind their class mates.

Practically speaking, this means that interventions to address these challenges contain a range of actions including: study support services to students provided every evening; individual counselling of children and adolescents; continuous support to families with children of school age regarding issues of subsistence, health, mental health, incidents of neglect, domestic violence or violence in the community; theatre groups and history courses to try to reduce school drop out as a result of low competence in the Greek language. In addition, young adults (over 16 years), who drop out of school, are encouraged to enrol in second-chance secondary schools, and in most Muslim communities, career orientation activities are organized and pupils are provided with advice on job searching, drafting a CV, communicating with services, and preparing for job interviews.

Source: Petmesidou and Polyzoidis (Greece)

All are examples of targeted policy interventions designed to respond to a vulnerable group and their particular challenges. Each country highlighted the importance of a holistic approach, considering how youth, gender, social exclusion, and education are interdependent, and providing a range of relevant interventions. The holistic approach can be seen in Denmark’s ‘Retention Taskforce’ (2012–2016) aimed at helping young people (especially young males, 15-25 years of age) from socially disadvantaged environments and from ethnic minorities to enrol and finish vocational education programmes (Box 5.2).

Box 5.2 Gender and Ethnicity - evidence from Denmark
In Denmark consultants work with educational professionals and volunteers working with youth using a variety of tools and methods such as the development of cooperation strategies, homework cafés, and knowledge sharing. In both country examples, the scope of interventions cover a range of issues (health, social exclusion, violence, education, language) and are provided at times and places that are convenient for the
beneficiaries (evening classes, schools, community health centres). A participative approach involving stakeholders and role modelling was highlighted as key in good policy. The work with the Muslim Roma youth highlighted the importance of working with adolescents, young children, families, and teachers to establish trust, support and buy-in. These activities are complemented by the recruitment of young Roma women (with an average age of 22 years) as “mediators” where their role is to encourage the enrolment of children and youngsters in schools and stimulate the families’ support for regular school attendance. This is a job opportunity for Roma young women, and beneficial to their community. So, in this case, the participatory approach includes a gender component aimed at increasing female participation and having young women serve as both role models and advocates for the programme within the community.

A similar approach is found in Denmark where ‘the Retention Taskforce’ and ‘We all Need Youth’ programmes actively involve young people, their parents, educators, and others. The ‘We Need All Youngsters’ programme, focusing primarily on deprived residential areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities, aims to assist young people by getting them to enrol in and finish an education programme. A gender component is present, however it focuses on young boys who have a higher dropout rate than the national average. The programme employs role models who visit schools, after school clubs, sports associations, etc. to inspire young people.

Source: Carstensen and Lyhne Ibsen (Denmark);

Whist there are some examples of good practice in general and good gender practices in particular, the programme in Thrace, Greece has not been formally evaluated. This will be an important next step in determining to what extent the programme has reached its objectives (see Plantenga et al. 2007). On the other hand the evaluations of ‘The Retention Task Force’ in Denmark show that the retention of students in education programs was significantly higher among the schools that have worked with ‘The Retention Task Force’ compared to schools that had not, and that the effect was greatest among the students with the lowest grades from primary school.

As this report has demonstrated the interaction of gender and ethnicity is important in shaping labour market vulnerabilities but gender mainstreaming has more of offer and the example from the UK provides an example of gender mainstreaming in youth employment related to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Maths (STEM) occupations (box 5.3).

Box 5.3 Gender and STEM jobs - evidence from the UK

In the UK one of the few examples of a gender sensitive policy measure towards education and training of the young is in STEM subjects. The ‘Diversity in STEM’ programme is funded by the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS) until the end of March 2016, and administered by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering. The goal is to explore the issues of diversity in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Maths (STEM), largely dominated by white men, and find solutions to increase diversity within this field. Targeted at women, disadvantaged youth, and ethnic minorities, the scheme attempts to increase participation of these groups, from school through to the workforce. It runs workshops and events with stakeholders and employers in STEM, bringing together ideas and developing ways of increasing diversity.

Attempts to increase female participation in STEM have been varied, with BIS establishing resources such as an equality and diversity toolkit, a resource pack for schools, and training for employers. In addition, a ‘classroom to boardroom’ pipeline has been set up, to promote STEM to women at all stages of life, and this initiative has tracked statistics on diversity. Whilst it is difficult to attribute patterns to the policy, statistics suggest these efforts have been positive. At secondary education level, the number of girls taking sciences is approaching parity with boys, with girls performing slightly better on average. The number of girls taking A-Levels in maths, chemistry, and biology has also been rising. At post-secondary education level, female STEM apprenticeship registrations increased by 7% in 2014 (compared to 1% for males), while young women undertaking STEM vocational qualifications have increased from 14,600 (8% of all starts) in 2010/11 to 237,100 (24%) in 2012/13. At the same time, the number of young women receiving engineering and technology degrees has increased by 5% since 2011 (as opposed to 1% for men). Although these figures point to a positive trend, it is also widely acknowledged that, given the vast STEM-related gender gap, more
needs to occur at all levels, addressing gender stereotyping at home, school and in the workplace. Even so, both the increased female STEM participation highlighted by these figures and the speed of this increase, seem to show that the Diversity in STEM drive has yielded positive results overall.

Source: Hadjivassiliou, Rickard and Swift (UK)

By comparison in Spain the example of the “Care procedure for female victims of gender violence” (Procedimiento de Atención a las Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia de Género) represents an approach towards a vulnerable group at greater risk of social exclusion, including access to the labour market.

Box 5.4 Gender mainstreaming and the PES - evidence from Spain

The Asturias public employment service (PES) has implemented the “Care procedure for female victims of gender violence” (Procedimiento de Atención a las Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia de Género). Women are the majority among victims of gender violence and represent a vulnerable group, at greater risk of exclusion in all social dimensions (labour market, access to services, etc.). It is important to guarantee access to all these services, especially labour market and training, to fight both current and future risks. The “Care procedure for women victims of gender violence” is an example of a strategy which aims to help to avoid the obstacles this group may face when they are neither in employment nor in training.

The procedure focuses on providing specialised and confidential attention to victims of gender violence. For this purpose a Network of Coordinators and Tutors was created among all PES offices in the region of Asturias to focus directly on the target group, to assure the confidentiality of data, and to design an “Employability Personal Itinerary”. The plan may be composed of different measures, according to individual and labour characteristics (counselling programme, training programme, self-employment programme, etc.). The regional PES is in charge of coordination, and a Working Group was established that meets once a year to assess the protocol results, to evaluate the main barriers and challenges, and to propose new measures to improve the procedure.

This protocol for offering better tailored services to a vulnerable group is a good practice considering the 4 steps of gender mainstreaming: first, because it builds awareness and ownership about a social problem which is gendered (gender violence) and, second, because it implies a fight against inequality regarding participation, resources, norms and values, and rights. Steps 3 (assessing the policy impact) and 4 (redesigning policy) are present, but not sufficiently developed. There will be an assessment of quantitative and qualitative data (step 3), but there is no clear plan of what will be assessed, or how. An opportunity to redesign may be possible at the Working Group's annual meeting, but so far there is no specific formulation or commitment.

Source: Tejero and González-Menéndez (Spain);

Whilst these examples show that there are some policy practices that do consider gender in relation to youth and employment these are often small scale and piecemeal. Indeed examples of gender mainstreaming across policy areas and countries are not evident and the issue of gender mainstreaming is not explicitly discussed in relation to youth policies.

5.5 Summary

To conclude, our comparative analysis of different regimes of STW places a sharp focus on class, gender and ethnicity. Education systems are becoming increasingly complex and its link with labour market has become more flexible. The dynamics as such have resulted in heterogeneous and fragmented transitions between school and labour market with women and migrants often suffering. Nevertheless, in spite of these common pressures this section also shows that STW regimes,
embedded in the specific structural, cultural, historical and institutional contexts of the various welfare states reproduce different regularities of inequalities in varying degrees.

We identify that the regimes characterized by institutionalized VET system and strong counselling support regarding training and employment, such as Denmark, have performed comparatively well in facilitating STW transitions of different vulnerable groups during the current crisis. One of the major strengths of the universal regime seems to lie in its minimal streaming and flexible education, supported by broad second chance options both in education and training at local levels. These polices play a major role in integrating vulnerable groups such as the low skilled and minority youth into education and labour market. By contrast, France’s employment-centred regime characterised by weak role of locality and fewer second chance options suffers from effective and timely implementation of policies and early disconnection of immigrant youth from education and labour market respectively.

The UK is an interesting case in terms of the effect of youth unemployment on vulnerable groups. In contrast with other countries, vulnerability is not directly correlated with immigration or minority status in this liberal regime. However, this finding should not hide the fact that low-skilled immigrant and minority youth such as Bangladeshis are particularly disadvantaged in a regime characterised by relatively weak VET system and low level of employer engagement with training.

The STW transitions are the most heterogeneous, non-linear and unpredictable in the sub-protective regimes. Limited standard workplaces, unprotected living conditions, and large informal economy combined by undeveloped VET system make socioeconomic status, gender and ethnicity strong determinants of youth unemployment in Spain and Greece. Additionally, compared to universal, employment-centered and liberal regime countries, gender vulnerability is a highly distinct character of sub-protective regimes in for example Greece.

With regards to integrating the gender dimension to youth policy each of the countries considered has in place a policy framework that deals to varying extents with youth, women, equality, vulnerability, and employment but none of the countries were considered have explicitly incorporated gender mainstreaming into youth labour market policies, with piecemeal additions of gender component to particular policy.

The exploration of policy and practices that incorporates both gender and gender mainstreaming into youth employment policies suggests that there is limited evidence of gender mainstreaming. In the countries considered here there is a policy focus on narrowing the gaps in outcomes for the most disadvantaged in only a limited range of areas. In both education and in the STW transition, with particular focus on improving the educational attainment, since this drastically improves one’s employment chances. Given marked gender differences in both school performance and occupational choices, there have been a number of efforts to both raise levels of educational attainment and to encourage wider career choices and training routes, traditionally overlooked by young women.
6. Summary and conclusions

Gender differences in youth labour markets and school to work transitions are frequently underestimated and there is often an assumption that gender gaps only open up around parenthood so that younger generations are largely unaffected. However, the evidence presented here from this comparative research suggests that gender differences open up early in the lifecourse and that the policy environment across European countries is not well adapted to these gender differences on the youth labour market. These gaps reflect segregation of educational and training choices as well as processes on the labour market that serve to reinforce gender roles and stereotypes.

Throughout the EU, young people have been hit disproportionately hard by the crisis, with youth unemployment increasing faster than that of older age groups in many countries. In addition, vulnerability risks such as poverty and social exclusion have become particularly pronounced, further exacerbating youth vulnerability. The reliance on temporary, part-time, and zero-hour contracts has further increased precariousness and has meant less stability and often more precarious working conditions for young people. Whilst there has been a convergence on a number of youth employment indicators such as un/employment, temporary and part-time employment between men and women, the reality is that this does not represent an improvement in young women’s working conditions but rather a levelling down due to an overall decrease in men’s labour market and educational outcomes - decreasing apparent inequalities in some cases but increasing overall precariousness for all. However such risks of being vulnerable extend beyond simple gender differences and need to take into account the nuances created by intersectionality within different institutional environments.

Whilst the situation of vulnerable young women and men in the labour market varies across the EU, and in the countries examined in this report, a number of similarities appear to play a role in influencing indicators such as NEET rates, youth un/employment rates, early school leaving, and gender pay gaps, and also play a role in the construction of a post-crisis labour market - characterized by temporary and part-time employment. Poverty and social inclusion, including family background, a gender segregated labour market, the role of ethnicity and disability, as well as the primordial role of the economic crisis together highlight the complexity and interdependency of vulnerability, youth, employment, and gender.

In this report we focus on two specific elements: Firstly we map vulnerability by gender across ethnic and class differences and secondly we focus on the extent to which policies for young people recognise gender differences and adopt a gender mainstreaming approach. We use a sample of countries in order to represent five regimes types for school-to-work transitions – universalistic (Denmark and the Netherlands), liberal (the United Kingdom), employment-centred (France and Belgium) sub-protective countries (Spain, Greece and Turkey) and post-socialist (Slovakia). The integration of labour market data and policy information from national experts enriches the analyses and helps explain the complex range of factors shaping youth transitions.

Our analysis of the EU-SILC data demonstrates that gender gaps for young people exist across almost all measures of educational and labour market statuses used to assess vulnerable outcomes. We also find strong evidence of the intersectionality of youth, gender and other forms of vulnerability.
linked to migrant status. The extent of these vulnerabilities varies across different school to work regimes but is nevertheless present across unemployment, NEET and part-time statuses. Our findings generally show that transitions are somewhat smoother and more predictable in systems where the education and training system have already differentiated young people both horizontally and vertically into tracks leading to different labour market destinations but there remain large country-specific differences. Transitions are more fluid where the flows of information between education and labour market are continuous and extensive as in the case of employment-centred regimes. In regimes where education systems are less stratified and where linkages between education and labour market are weaker transitions seem to be more interrupted. Applying a typology of welfare regimes to the comparison of youth transition contexts, specifically across vulnerabilities, captures some of the variation in national transitional systems, but they leave substantial variation unaccounted for mostly because typologies were not developed specifically to explain national differences in school-to-work transitions or the gender differences within. Our analysis of the policy environment towards young people demonstrates the importance of considering the country-specific institutional environment when analysing youth labour markets. We show that policy towards youth labour markets is often gender blind and there is limited evidence of consistent gender mainstreaming. Given the gender gaps identified in our mapping exercise these policies could be more efficient if they recognised gender differences – for example school drop-out rates for boys, segregation of training opportunities for girls and the interaction of gender and ethnicity in educational choices. Although we find some evidence of good practice that recognises gender differences at the margins and indeed the intersectionality of youth, gender and other forms of vulnerability more could be done.

We draw a number of conclusions from our work for future research in the area of school to work transitions.

• we suggest that researchers need to approach the youth labour market from a more consistently gender-sensitive approach in order to understand the nuances and dynamics of emerging gender gaps.

• we suggest that greater consideration of the intersectionalities of gender with other demographic factors can help explain the segmentation of the youth labour market and understand life-long repercussions on the risks of vulnerabilities.

• we suggest that in relation to vulnerabilities, researchers need measures and data that are sensitive to the impact of young people living in the parental home and the risk that vulnerabilities are disguised by the household level data.

We also draw a number of conclusions from our work for future policy making in the area of school to work transitions.

• we suggest that policy makers need to adopt a more consistent gender mainstreaming approach in order to develop more efficient policies that reflect the realities of youth labour market

• we suggest that policy makers need to adopt a more consistent gender mainstreaming
• we suggest that policy makers need to adopt a more consistent gender mainstreaming approach in order to capture the intersectionality of gender with other demographic characteristics.
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8. Annexes

Annex 1: Average Predicted Probabilities by Gender, Migrant Status and Education Level over Time

**Panel a. Denmark**

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Panel b. The Netherlands
Less Than Upper Secondary  Upper Secondary  Tertiary
Average Predicted Probability of Being Full-Time Employed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Part-Time Employed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Unemployed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Inactive
Panel c. France

Less Than Upper Secondary  Upper Secondary  Tertiary

Average Predicted Probability of Being Full-Time Employed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Part-Time Employed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Unemployed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Inactive
Panel e. The Slovak Republic

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Panel f. The UK
Less Than Upper Secondary  Upper Secondary  Tertiary

Average Predicted Probability of Being Full-Time Employed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Part-Time Employed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Unemployed

Average Predicted Probability of Being Inactive
**Panel g. Spain**

*Less Than Upper Secondary  Upper Secondary  Tertiary*

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| Average Predicted Probability of Being Part-Time Employed |
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| Average Predicted Probability of Being Unemployed |
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| Average Predicted Probability of Being Inactive |
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### Panel h. Greece

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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant F.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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</table>

**Tertiary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural M.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural F.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant M.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant F.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Average Predicted Probability of Being Full-Time Employed**

**Average Predicted Probability of Being Part-Time Employed**

**Average Predicted Probability of Being Unemployed**

**Average Predicted Probability of Being Inactive**
### Annex 2: Estimation of Employment Status, Relative Risk Rates

#### Panel a. Part-Time Employment (Relative to Full-Time Employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment (Ref. Lt. Upper Sec.)</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>GR</th>
<th>TR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Secondary</td>
<td>1.351**</td>
<td>0.712**</td>
<td>0.669**</td>
<td>0.529**</td>
<td>0.307**</td>
<td>0.734**</td>
<td>1.594**</td>
<td>0.931**</td>
<td>1.100**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.367**</td>
<td>0.703**</td>
<td>0.468**</td>
<td>0.544**</td>
<td>0.231**</td>
<td>0.580**</td>
<td>1.668**</td>
<td>1.091**</td>
<td>1.005**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender and Migrant Status (Ref. Native Males)</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>GR</th>
<th>TR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Females</td>
<td>2.063**</td>
<td>7.454**</td>
<td>5.345**</td>
<td>7.548**</td>
<td>0.610**</td>
<td>3.121**</td>
<td>5.106**</td>
<td>2.530**</td>
<td>7.252**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Males</td>
<td>1.613**</td>
<td>2.102**</td>
<td>4.252**</td>
<td>1.660**</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.420**</td>
<td>1.781**</td>
<td>1.166**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interaction between level of education and gender and migrant status**

- **Nat. Fem. * Upp. Sec.**
  - 1.544**
  - 1.922**
  - 0.939**
  - 1.098**
  - 4.067**
  - 1.048**
  - 0.666**
  - 1.382**
  - 0.320**
- **Nat. Fem. * Tert.**
  - 1.243**
  - 0.726**
  - 0.519**
  - 0.391**
  - 2.410**
  - 0.722**
  - 0.406**
  - 0.757**
  - 0.260**
- **Mig. Males * Upp. Sec.**
  - 0.336**
  - 0.977**
  - 0.633**
  - 1.673**
  - 0.862**
  - 0.795**
  - 0.747**
- **Mig. Males * Tert.**
  - 1.674**
  - 2.175**
  - 0.638**
  - 0.960**
  - 0.985**
  - 1.361**
  - 2.912**
- **Mig. Fem. * Upp. Sec.**
  - 1.947**
  - 0.233**
  - 3.875**
  - 2.646**
  - 0.556**
  - 0.684**
  - 1.227**
- **Mig. Fem. * Tert.**
  - 1.696**
  - 0.063**
  - 1.916**
  - 0.463**
  - 0.559**
  - 0.470**
  - 0.576**

**Observations**

- 8,356
  - 13,927
  - 20,187
  - 18,766
  - 14,251
  - 13,822
  - 17,643

** and * denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Estimation uses population weights.

#### Panel b. Unemployment (Relative to Full-Time Employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment (Ref. Lt. Upper Sec.)</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>GR</th>
<th>TR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Secondary</td>
<td>0.884**</td>
<td>1.370**</td>
<td>0.965**</td>
<td>0.973**</td>
<td>1.370**</td>
<td>1.127**</td>
<td>1.250**</td>
<td>1.308**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.018**</td>
<td>1.222**</td>
<td>1.030**</td>
<td>1.238**</td>
<td>0.855**</td>
<td>1.134**</td>
<td>0.948**</td>
<td>1.154**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.762**</td>
<td>1.358**</td>
<td>0.995**</td>
<td>1.192**</td>
<td>0.752**</td>
<td>1.166**</td>
<td>1.017**</td>
<td>1.202**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.772**</td>
<td>1.557**</td>
<td>1.231**</td>
<td>1.380**</td>
<td>1.175**</td>
<td>1.415**</td>
<td>1.170**</td>
<td>1.102**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.157**</td>
<td>1.227**</td>
<td>1.246**</td>
<td>1.456**</td>
<td>1.393**</td>
<td>1.365**</td>
<td>1.419**</td>
<td>1.632**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.093**</td>
<td>1.762**</td>
<td>1.101**</td>
<td>1.246**</td>
<td>1.169**</td>
<td>1.570**</td>
<td>1.490**</td>
<td>1.740**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>2.175**</td>
<td>1.968**</td>
<td>1.148**</td>
<td>1.673**</td>
<td>1.927**</td>
<td>1.556**</td>
<td>1.889**</td>
<td>2.227**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.673**</td>
<td>2.273**</td>
<td>1.097**</td>
<td>1.449**</td>
<td>1.316**</td>
<td>1.637**</td>
<td>2.734**</td>
<td>2.236**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**

- 8,356
  - 13,927
  - 20,187
  - 18,766
  - 14,251
  - 13,822
  - 17,643

** and * denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Estimation uses population weights.
**Panel c. Inactivity (Relative to Full-Time Employment)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>GR</th>
<th>TR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Secondary</td>
<td>0.379**</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>0.85**</td>
<td>1.264**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.127**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.209**</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
<td>0.569**</td>
<td>2.001**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gender and Migrant Status (ref. Native Males)**

| Migrant Males | 2.362** | 2.684** | 1.303** | 2.709** | 0.462** | 1.336** | 1.075** |
| Migrant Females | 4.253** | 55.849** | 9.136** | 17.395** | 32.743** | 6.032** | 11.940** |

**Interaction between level of education and gender and migrant status**

| Nat. Fem. * Upp. Sec. | 1.389** | 0.871** | 1.270** | 0.737** | 1.077** | 1.286** | 0.779** | 0.306** | 0.332** |
| Nat. Fem. * Tert. | 2.659** | 0.712** | 0.392** | 0.423** | 1.524** | 0.999 | 0.600** | 0.065** | 0.129** |
| Mig. Males * Upp. Sec. | 0.136** | 1.197** | 1.770** | 3.358** | 4.168** | 0.846** | 0.346** |
| Mig. Males. * Tert. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.287** | 2.296** | 7.057** | 2.051** | 0.761** |
| Mig. Fem. * Upp. Sec. | 2.088** | 0.285** | 3.570** | 2.357** | 0.389** | 0.827** | 0.505** |
| Mig. Fem. * Tert. | 2.032** | 0.215** | 1.806** | 2.466** | 0.305** | 1.123** | 0.172** |

**Time Effects (ref. Year=2005)**

| D.Year=2006 | 1.038** | 0.617** | 0.902** | 0.810** | 0.908** | 0.923** | 1.063** | 1.239** |
| D.Year=2007 | 0.781** | 0.620** | 0.913** | 0.732** | 0.863** | 0.933** | 1.053** | 1.339** |
| D.Year=2008 | 0.539** | 0.825** | 0.908** | 0.611** | 0.761** | 0.949** | 1.018** | 1.346** |
| D.Year=2009 | 0.659** | 0.776** | 1.049** | 0.931** | 1.193** | 0.940** | 1.370** | 1.227** |
| D.Year=2010 | 0.810** | 0.701** | 1.218** | 1.066** | 1.331** | 1.310** | 1.457** | 1.379** |
| D.Year=2011 | 0.889** | 1.070** | 1.382** | 0.867** | 1.107** | 0.935** | 2.027** | 2.152** |
| D.Year=2012 | 1.541** | 1.111** | 1.288** | 0.940** | 1.181** | 1.373** | 2.044** | 2.231** | 0.990** |
| D.Year=2013 | 1.735** | 1.548** | 1.561** | 1.168** | 1.566** | 1.432** | 2.179** | 2.571** |

**Observations**


**Annex 3: Wage Estimations by Gender and Migrant Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>GR</th>
<th>TR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>-0.203**</td>
<td>-0.337**</td>
<td>-0.105**</td>
<td>-0.093**</td>
<td>-0.071**</td>
<td>-0.218**</td>
<td>-0.119**</td>
<td>-0.152**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Female</td>
<td>-0.103**</td>
<td>-0.182**</td>
<td>-0.107**</td>
<td>-0.060**</td>
<td>-0.255**</td>
<td>-0.167**</td>
<td>-0.148**</td>
<td>-0.155**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Male</td>
<td>-0.063**</td>
<td>-0.034**</td>
<td>-0.073**</td>
<td>-0.087**</td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>-0.035**</td>
<td>-0.179**</td>
<td>-0.181**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Female</td>
<td>-0.108**</td>
<td>-0.077**</td>
<td>-0.079**</td>
<td>-0.131**</td>
<td>-0.167**</td>
<td>-0.132**</td>
<td>-0.346**</td>
<td>-0.437**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Native Female</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
<td>0.192**</td>
<td>0.078**</td>
<td>-0.010**</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
<td>0.086**</td>
<td>-0.013**</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Migrant Male</td>
<td>-0.037**</td>
<td>0.041**</td>
<td>-0.029**</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.072**</td>
<td>0.111**</td>
<td>0.165**</td>
<td>0.279**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Migrant</td>
<td>-0.113**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>0.124**</td>
<td>0.089**</td>
<td>-0.087**</td>
<td>0.148**</td>
<td>0.174**</td>
<td>0.249**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Upper Secondary</td>
<td>0.191**</td>
<td>0.124**</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
<td>0.106**</td>
<td>0.147**</td>
<td>0.099**</td>
<td>0.127**</td>
<td>0.161**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.345**</td>
<td>0.352**</td>
<td>0.229**</td>
<td>0.295**</td>
<td>0.341**</td>
<td>0.304**</td>
<td>0.280**</td>
<td>0.455**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr. After Grad.</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>0.028**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sq. Yr. After Grad.</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.263**</td>
<td>2.133**</td>
<td>1.734**</td>
<td>2.102**</td>
<td>0.079**</td>
<td>2.004**</td>
<td>1.293**</td>
<td>1.101**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**

| 39,779 | 44,237 | 62,486 | 30,765 | 48,477 | 42,502 | 63,861 | 20,229 | 58,036 |

**Note**

** and * denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Estimation uses population weights. See section 4 for details.
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Tracing the interface between numerical flexibility and income security for European youth during the economic crisis
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ILO: International Labour Office  
[www.iolo.org](http://www.iolo.org)

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
[www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

OSE: Observatoire Sociale Européen  
[www.ose.be](http://www.ose.be)

SOLIDAR: European network of NGOs working to advance social justice in Europe  
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